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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND INTERSTATE GOVERNMENT
TORT*
Louise Weinberg**

ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the Supreme Court made a serious mistake last term,
when, in a case of interstate government tort, it tore up useful options that should
be available to each state for the rare cases in which they would be of service. In
seeking to insulate a state from liability when its employee intrudes on a sister
state’s territory and causes injury there, the Court stripped every state of power, in
cases of interstate government tort, to try injuries occurring on its own territory to
its own residents—an unprecedented disregard of a state’s acknowledged
traditional interests. Indeed, the Court went beyond interstate government tort and
seemed to say that the Constitution prohibits litigation against a state in all cases,
whether to enforce state or federal law, whether in state or federal courts. It is
argued that the Court’s originalist and structural arguments cannot withstand
scrutiny. Moreover, the Court’s position, if firmly established, would balk the
actual interests even of a state as defendant. The states typically do see a need to
meet their tort responsibilities. Real damage has been done, but it is argued that
conservative and liberal views on judicial review of government action in time
may well converge to put an end to judicial abnegation of the duty to place
government at all levels under the rule of law.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 2
I. OUR TWO CASES ...................................................................... 9
A. Nevada v. Hall.............................................................. 9
B. Franchise Tax Board.................................................. 11
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TORT AND ORDINARY TORT: TWO
DIFFERENT WRONGS, TWO DIFFERENT REMEDIES................. 21
A. Nevada v. Hall: A Non-Federal Interstate Tort Claims
“Act” at Common Law .................................................. 22
B. Franchise Tax Board: A Non-Federal Interstate
Civil Rights “Act” at Common Law ................................. 25
C. A Background Case....................................................... 26
* Copyright © 2020 by Louise Weinberg. All rights reserved
**
William B. Bates Chair in the Administration of Justice and Professor of Law, University of Texas, Austin. My thanks to correspondents Erwin Chemerinsky, Arthur Hellman,
and Stephen Vladeck, and to participants at the colloquium on an earlier draft of this paper
at the University of Texas Law School, Austin on November 15, 2019.

1

2

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:1

D. Applying Modern Legal Theory to Our Two Cases.............. 29
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, AMERICAN HISTORY,
AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY......................................... 31
A. On Constitutional Structure ........................................... 31
1. Justice Thomas’s Cleverest Argument .................... 32
2. On the Source of Law.............................................. 33
3. The Constitution’s Actual Structure ....................... 35
B. On State Sovereignty...................................................... 38
1. Colonial Times......................................................... 39
2. Union and Revolution............................................. 39
3. The Birth of the States............................................. 40
4. The Real Birth of State Sovereignty........................ 43
5. The Rollup of Conventions ..................................... 43
6. The Death of State Sovereignty............................... 47
7. The Civil War ........................................................... 47
C. On State Immunity ....................................................... 49
1. The Court’s Position and the Real Position ........... 49
2. State Immunity and the Constitution ..................... 50
3. State Immunity and Federal Common Law ........... 52
IV. ON THE PLACE OF TRIAL ....................................................... 54
V. THE COSTS OF LIABILITY ....................................................... 55
VI. THE COSTS OF IMMUNITY: WHY STATES PROVIDE FOR
PUBLIC-LAW LITIGATION ....................................................... 56
VII. A POSSIBLE DIFFICULTY FOR TWENTY-NINE STATES .............. 60
VIII. WHAT, THEN, IS TO BE DONE?.............................................. 62
IX. CHANGING PLACES, SHIFTING POSITIONS ............................. 71
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 73
III.

INTRODUCTION
1
The Supreme Court’s overrule of Nevada v. Hall this past Term
2
was widely perceived to be a threat to Roe v. Wade. Reporters of le-

1. 440 U.S. 40 (1979) (Stevens, J.) (holding that there is no principle of sovereign
immunity that would prevent California from taking jurisdiction over Nevada, where negligent driving by a University of Nevada driver caused a collision in California resulting in severe personal injuries to a California family). For interesting perspectives on Nevada v. Hall,
see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The International Origins of American Federalism,
120 COLUM. L. REV. 835 (2020); Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 1077 (2018); and James E. Pfander & Jessica Dwinell, A Declaratory Theory of State Accountability, 102 VA. L. REV. 153 (2016).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have a constitutional right to abortion in
the first trimester of pregnancy; in the second trimester, that the state can render nugatory
the right to abortion by purporting to regulate for the safety of the mother; and in the third
trimester, that the interest of the fetus is paramount and that the state can prohibit abortion
outright).
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3
gal news could find little else to say about Nevada v. Hall or its
4
overruling case, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt. But neither case had
anything to do with Roe v. Wade. The apparent threat to Roe lay in
the fact that lawyers arguing in support of Nevada v. Hall relied al5
most exclusively on stare decisis. The thinking was that if a precedent of forty years’ vintage could be tossed aside, Roe must be in
danger. As far as the press could see, Nevada v. Hall itself was of no
interest.
After all, Nevada v. Hall was a very ordinary case involving a two6
7
car collision. Its apparently surprising holding, that a state could

3. See, e.g., Editorial, Liberals Who Cry Roe, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/liberals-who-cry-roe-11557876134 [https://perma.cc/FRU6YMSL]; Leah Litman, Opinion, Supreme Court Liberals Raise Alarm Bells About Roe v. Wade:
Conservatives May be Laying the Foundation for the Reversal of the Landmark Abortion Decision, N.Y.
TIMES (May 13, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/opinion/roe-supremecourt.html https://perma.cc/HGK9-GAU3]; see also Thomas J. Molony, Taking Another Look
at the Call on the Field: Roe, Chief Justice Roberts, and Stare Decisis, 4 HARV. J.L. & SOC. POL. 733
(2020) (taking the same tack).
4. 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019) (reversing Nevada v. Hall in view of the paucity of cases
relying on it and holding that the Constitution does not “permit” disregard of a state’s sovereign immunity). One month after this decision was handed down, the Federal Circuit departed from it, declining to extend state sovereign immunity to administrative patent proceedings. Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp., 926 F.3d 1327, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
The Federal Circuit relied on a theory of “constructive” waiver that occurs when the state
seeks the benefit of the patent system by applying for a patent, a theory once suggested to
me by my former colleague, Mitch Berman, who later concluded dispiritedly that the idea
could not get off the ground. I agreed, recalling that the doctrine of “constructive waiver,”
see Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), had been disapproved in Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). See Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese &
Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How To “Fix”
Florida Prepaid (and How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037 (2001). The Constitution’s explicit
grant to Congress of power over intellectual property, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing that,
in order to encourage science and the useful arts, Congress may grant patents and copyrights for limited times), arguably should have saved patent and copyright cases from the
indefensible rule of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), improvidently stripping
Congress of Article I power to overcome the Eleventh Amendment. But the Federal Circuit’s
exercise in legal realism, although distinguishing administrative from judicial proceedings
and stressing the explicitness of the grant of power over patents, could not overcome Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999),
which held the state immune notwithstanding the specificity of the patent and copyright
power in Article I, Section 8. The Supreme Court has since carved out a needed exception
to Seminole Tribe for cases in bankruptcy. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356
(2006). But the Katz exception is limited to bankruptcy. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994,
1002 (2020). There will be no further exceptions.
5. Dean Chemerinsky’s fine brief for Hyatt stressed that there was no reason to overrule Nevada v. Hall, Brief for Respondent at 31–32, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct.
1485 (2019) (No. 114-1175), 2015 WL 6467826, as did his oral argument, Transcript of Oral
Argument at 38, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (No. 17-1299), 2019
WL 144815. For a similar concern for stare decisis, see also Stephen Vladeck’s fine Brief of
Professors of Federal Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Franchise
Tax Board v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (No. 114-1175), 2018 WL 6168772. (I was a signatory). I note that neither the Chemerinsky brief nor the Vladeck brief argued for Nevada v.
Hall on its merits.
6. For the facts of Nevada v. Hall, see supra note 1; and infra notes 37–38.
7. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 446–47 (1979).
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haul another state into its courts, also turned out to be of slight
importance, if the frequency of resort to it is any measure. In the
forty years since Nevada v. Hall was decided, only fourteen cases relying on it could be unearthed, with all the diligence of counsel
8
and amici.
9
Shortly before his death, Justice Stevens, author of Nevada v.
Hall, was interviewed about the death of that case. Stevens pointed
out that the very sparseness of cases that allowed the Franchise
Court to find insufficient reason to preserve Nevada v. Hall could
as easily have prompted the Court to find insufficient reason to
10
overrule it. Even Justice Stevens had little of substance to say
about the case. But in my opinion Nevada v. Hall deserved to be
argued on its merits.
The occasion for reconsideration of a forty-year-old case was the
11
long litigation in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, which came to a
head in 2019, its third iteration before the Supreme Court. 12 Like
Nevada v. Hall, Franchise Tax Board was a case against state officials.
But Franchise Tax Board, unlike Nevada v. Hall, was not about some
ordinary road accident in another state. Nevada v. Hall involved the
negligence or recklessness of a driver who happened to be a state
worker driving a state university car into another state, on state
13
business. Instead, the tort in Franchise Tax Board was deliberate. Officials of one state were found by a jury to have behaved in another
14
state with intentional and damaging abusiveness. The only thing
our two cases had in common was that in each of them a state was
held to be within the jurisdiction of another state.
The question whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall had been
raised twice previously in the Franchise Tax Board litigation. In 2003,
in what I will call Franchise I, the Court, by Justice O’Connor, unan-

8. The paucity of cases was noted during oral argument by both Justice Alito and Justice Kavanaugh. Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct.
1485 (2019) (No. 17-1299), 2019 WL 144815 (Alito, J.) (“Is there any reliance here?”); id. at
54 (Kavanaugh, J.) (“[T]here’s no real reliance interest at stake.”). The paucity of cases is
probably best explained by the fact that they typically arise between neighboring states engaged in substantial interstate activity, rather than between any two of fifty states.
9. Justice Stevens passed away on July 16, 2019.
10. Justice Stevens remarked that “overruling Nevada against Hall—it makes absolutely
no sense . . . . Because states have been sued in the courts of other states so rarely, that you
might just as well have a rule you can follow rather than change it 40 years later for a different rule that clearly is not any better than the other one.” Ask the Author: Interview with Justice
John Paul Stevens, SCOTUSBLOG (June 12, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06
/ask-the-author-interview-with-justice-john-paul-stevens [https://perma.cc/58XS-CUHU].
11. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt (Franchise III), 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (Thomas, J.).
12. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt (Franchise I), 538 U.S. 488 (2003) (O’Connor, J.); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt (Franchise II), 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (Breyer, J.).
13. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 446–47.
14. See Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1491 (Thomas, J.) (discussing the jury award).
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15
imously sustained Nevada v. Hall. Then, in a 2016 iteration of the
case, Franchise II, the Court granted certiorari, among other issues to
16
reconsider Nevada v. Hall. But then the unexpected death of Justice Scalia left a sudden vacancy on the Court, and President
Obama’s nomination of Merrick Garland to succeed Scalia was
17
buried by the determined inaction of the Senate. So it fell to an
eight-Justice Court in Franchise II to decide whether to overrule Ne18
vada v. Hall. The Court split 4:4 on that issue, with the result that
Nevada v. Hall was let stand—for the time being.
At last, in 2019, in Franchise III, the question whether to overrule
19
Nevada v. Hall was cleanly presented, and a nine-Justice Court
20
stood ready to decide it. Nevada v. Hall was overruled. When litigation under Nevada v. Hall was disapproved, obviously litigation
under Franchise III was cashiered as well, since both were state assertions of jurisdiction over another state.
It is a chief argument of this paper that the loss of access to civil
courts at the place of injury and plaintiff’s home in these cases is
seriously to be regretted. One might suppose that this loss of access
to adjudication at the place of injury and the plaintiff’s home
might not matter much, as long as the defendant state can be sued
in its own courts. But in Franchise III, the Supreme Court was apparently of the view that a defendant state may not be sued at
home, either. According to Justice Thomas, writing for the narrow
conservative majority in Franchise III, a state can never be sued, at
home or away, without its consent. There is blanket immunity.
This immunity is a matter of federal, not state law. The federalization of the defense of state immunity began in 1795 with the

15. Franchise I, 538 U.S. at 496.
16. 138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (granting certiorari in Franchise III).
17. Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016. President Obama nominated Merrick
Garland to replace him on March 16, 2016. See U.S. Senators on the Nomination of
Merrick Garland, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/U.S._Senators_on_thenomination_
of_Merrick_Garland [https://perma.cc/DXU3-93B5].
18. Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1280 (Breyer, J.). There was a dissent by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Thomas. 136 S. Ct. at 1283. There was also a silent concurrence by
Justice Alito. Id. On the uses of silent concurrences, see Greg Goelzhauser, Silent Concurrences, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 351 (2016).
19. The question of whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall in this iteration of the Franchise
Tax Board litigation was the only question presented. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1490 (stating
that certiorari was granted to decide this sole question). In contrast, in Franchise II, 136 S. Ct.
1277, the 2016 case, a main question, bizarrely, was whether, under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the Nevada court had to apply Nevada’s own immunity law to a sister state within its
jurisdiction. Id. at 1281–83. Of course, the obligations of a court under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause are to another state, not the forum state. Moreover, as the position has developed, the obligation is to the other state’s judgments, not its laws. See infra notes 67, 76, 89–92
and accompanying text.
20. Justice Brett Kavanaugh was sworn in on October 8, 2018. The case was argued January 9, 2019.
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21

Eleventh Amendment, prohibiting federal diversity jurisdiction
over a state in a state-law case. The Supreme Court has been expanding the scope of federalized state immunity ever since. By the
end of the twentieth century, this untethered process had culmi22
nated in Alden v. Maine, insulating state defendants from suits to
enforce federal law in the state’s own courts.
The trouble with Franchise III is that it extends the shield of federal immunity to state courts in state-law cases. It did so notwithstanding the Tenth Amendment, which would seem to reserve
23
such matters to the states. Justice Thomas achieved this by
grounding federalized immunity on the vague premise that “the
Constitution” does not “permit” suits against an unconsenting
24
state. Justice Thomas located federalized state sovereign immunity in the structure and history of the Constitution. This holding, on
these arguments, necessarily implies blanket federalized state immunity in all cases, state or federal, whether tried in federal courts,
the courts of a sister state, or in the state’s own courts.
To justify this radical position, Justice Thomas offered familiar
25
originalist, but, in my view, ahistorical claims for state immunity.
He relied in part upon statements made during the Founding period which might be thought to imply constitutional recognition of
state sovereignty. (One is reminded of a famous comment by
Holmes: “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
26
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” ) But to the
extent that any of Thomas’s historical arguments had some objective correlative in the eighteenth century, they tended to support
the states’ own view of sovereign immunity—that the defense,

21. The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits federal diversity suits in state-law cases against a state, was extended to federal-question cases in federal
courts in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment, read literally,
furnishes only a rule of construction for the several diversity jurisdictions to which the federal judicial power extends under Article III of the Constitution. In the Amendment’s override of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), a diversity action against a state on an
ordinary contract, the Eleventh Amendment obviously is intended to shield states from suit
in federal court only in state-law cases typical of the diversity jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts.
22. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding the states to be shielded with federalized sovereign
immunity in their own courts in suits to enforce an act of Congress).
23. This was one of Dean Chemerinsky’s points in oral argument. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 28, 31, Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (No. 17-1299), 2019 WL 144815.
24. See Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1490 (“This case . . . requires us to decide whether the
Constitution permits a State to be sued by a private party without its consent in the courts of a
different State.”) (emphasis added). On this formulation of the issue, see infra notes 108,
124 and accompanying text.
25. For the actual history, see infra Sections III.B–C.
26. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). Ironically, Justice Thomas, the author of Franchise III, has quoted this himself. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1897 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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where it existed among the states in early days, was a creature of a
state’s own common law. Justice Thomas had to acknowledge this
27
fact. There was no early precedent for federalized state sovereign
immunity.
But there is a later history of federal-law immunity for the states.
The Eleventh Amendment of 1795 is a rule of construction for the
diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, immunizing a state from
28
commercial liability to a nonresident in state-law cases. In 1890, in
29
Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court, in an apparent attempt to
avoid declaring the Amendment anomalous and obsolete (anomalous because prohibiting suits against a state by nonresidents but
not by residents), extended Eleventh Amendment immunity from
the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts to their federal-question
jurisdiction. This relieved states of the duty—at least in federal
courts—of complying with acts of Congress or the Constitution. It
also created a further anomaly—federal immunity would be operative in one set of courts only. As if unwilling to acknowledge error,
or perhaps in nostalgia for an antebellum view of states’ rights, or
perhaps in the spirit of reconciliation between North and South,
the Supreme Court thereafter doubled down on the Eleventh
Amendment and has been piling up a superstructure of further extensions of it ever since. In a late case the Court went so far as to
extend federalized immunity in federal-law cases to actions against
30
a state in state courts. But even so, it was not foreseen that the
Court would go so far as to discover a federal sovereign immunity
for the states from state-law actions in state courts.
Justice Breyer, dissenting in Franchise III, responded to Justice
Thomas’s historical arguments with his own set of originalist ideas.
He attempted to find respondent Hyatt’s stare decisis argument
convincing, but it was scarcely more so than Thomas’s historicist
argument, given the apparent lack of large-scale reliance on Neva-

27. See 139 S. Ct. at 1494 (Thomas, J.) (“In short, at the time of the founding, it was well
settled that States were immune under both the common law and the law of nations.”). This
would be more or less true, perhaps, if Justice Thomas had limited the conclusion to the
period preceding the Founding and made clear that he was talking about state common law
and general international law. See William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional
Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 (2017) (arguing that state sovereign immunity originally was a matter
of state common law and had nothing to do with the Constitution).
28. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state.”).
29. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
30. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). For early extensions of federalized state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, see, for example, LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL
COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 779–846
(1994).
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da v. Hall. Justice Breyer did not consider the usefulness of Nevada
31
v. Hall, save for a bare remark about interests on “both sides.”
I have said that Nevada v. Hall should have been argued and
considered on its merits. Its actual empowerment of the states in
their shared interests should have commended Nevada v. Hall to
32
the states, as well as to the Supreme Court, as a positive good.
These shared interests, widely understood, are the states’ governmental interests in providing their residents with access to their
own courts, in compensating their residents for injuries caused by
the unlawful conduct of another, and in deterring any such conduct on their territory in the future. These are fundamental tort
policies in every state.
The states might have paused, in their rush to sign briefs demanding overrule of Nevada v. Hall, to consider the further interest they share, not only with each other but with the nation—an in33
terest in “domestic tranquility” —in interstate peace. Under the
new blanket federal immunity in cases of interstate government
tort, there can be little interstate peace because courts will have
lost their power, through civil suits brought by their own residents,
to provide a judicial check on another government’s misconduct
on their own territory. How can our federalism help but be diminished under such license?
If we disregard as dictum the Court’s apparent extension of federalized immunity to the tortfeasor state in its own courts, and limit
Franchise III to its facts, it raises the narrower question whether the
Court should have denied to private persons access to their own
state’s courts just because the defendant is a state actor. It is not
customary in our jurisprudence to deny injured residents access to
their own state’s courts for suit against nonresident tortfeasors over
whom jurisdiction can be obtained. The typical state long-arm statute is all that is needed. We pay taxes for our state courts, and, until Franchise III, it was generally assumed that a state citizen’s choice
to sue at home, if jurisdiction over the defendant can be obtained,
would be respected as a matter of course.

31. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1504 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (remarking that
“sovereignty interests here lie on both sides of the constitutional equation”).
32. For commentary urging overrule of Nevada v. Hall, see, for example, Timothy Dill,
A Test of Sovereignty: Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Gilbert P. Hyatt, 14
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 129 (2019); and Ann Woolhandler, Interstate Sovereign Immunity, 2006 S. CT. REV. 249, 254–59 (2006).
33. The Preamble to the Constitution of the United States sets out the purposes of the
Constitution: “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”
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Yet forty-five states were signatory to amicus briefs urging over34
rule of Nevada v. Hall. These were heavy guns indeed, and we lost
Nevada v. Hall. One wonders to what calculation of advantage we
can ascribe the zeal of so many states in rushing to sign briefs urging the Supreme Court to strip their own courts of the option to
govern events within their own borders under their own law.
Nothing in Nevada v. Hall or Franchise I impaired the sovereignty
of each state in its own courts or a state’s power to adjudicate inju35
ries to its own residents on its own territory. But overruling those
36
cases did.
I. OUR TWO CASES
A. Nevada v. Hall
The Nevada v. Hall story began back in 1968. A University of Nevada employee drove into California in a university car on university business and there collided with another car, causing serious
37
personal injuries to the California occupants of the other car.
38
The Nevada driver was killed.
The injured Californians filed suit at home in California. The
Nevada driver’s estate, if any, could offer little in the way of meaningful compensation. But the University of Nevada is an arm of the
state of Nevada, and jurisdiction over the state was asserted when it
was asserted over the university. The state, filing a special appearance, moved for dismissal on the point of jurisdiction, arguing that
a state cannot take jurisdiction over a sister state. As to such attempted jurisdiction, Nevada argued, all states are immune. The
39
lower California court, agreeing, dismissed. But eventually the

34. See Brief of Indiana and 44 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (No. 17-1299), 2018 WL 1850970; Brief of the Council of State
Governments, National Ass’n of Counties, National League of Cities, United States Conference of Mayors, City/County Management Ass’n & International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (No. 14-1175), 2015 WL
5316999.
35. Justice Breyer made this point in his dissent in Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1504, as did
Justice Sotomayor in oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Franchise III, 139 S.
Ct. 1485 (No. 17-1299), 2019 WL 144815.
36. Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (Stevens, J.) (stating that, if the states are
forced to accord each other immunity that would be a greater offense to state sovereignty
than prohibiting them from doing so).
37. See id. at 413 n.4 (“The evidence indicated that respondent John Hall, a minor at
the time of the accident, sustained severe head injuries resulting in permanent brain damage which left him severely retarded and unable to care for himself, and that respondent
Patricia Hall, his mother, suffered severe physical and emotional injuries.”).
38. Id.
39. Hall v. Univ. of Nev., 503 P.2d 1363 (Cal. 1972) (en banc).
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California Supreme Court reversed, sustaining California’s jurisdic40
tion over Nevada. The United States Supreme Court denied certio41
rari.
Back in the California trial court, the jury awarded the plaintiffs
42
damages of $1,125,000. In 1979, the Supreme Court, in an opin43
ion by Justice Stevens, affirmed. Justice Stevens found nothing in
44
the Eleventh Amendment or its background postulates that would
immunize a state in a sister state’s courts. He pointed to California’s governmental interests as the place of wrongful conduct and
injury—interests in deterring unsafety on California’s roads and in
45
compensating Californians injured by such unsafety.
There was a dissent by Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice
46
Burger and Justice Rehnquist. There was also a dissent by Justice
47
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger. To a millennial eye,
both dissents seem weak. Justice Blackmun trod the ground in a
tentative way, and Justice Rehnquist, in a rambling opinion,
rounded up the usual references.
To my mind, Nevada v. Hall solved a real problem: the existence
of a remedial gap. Until Nevada v. Hall, there seems to have been
no thought given to the propriety of trial of one state in the courts
of another, perhaps because state officials have little business out
of state, as evidenced by the above-noted paucity of cases that
48
emerged in the wake of Nevada v. Hall. And since the state of Nevada waives immunity, there would have been jurisdiction over the
defendant state, Nevada, in any event in its own courts. That is why,
49
in Nevada v. Hall, Nevada did not plead sovereign immunity. Nevada’s own sovereign immunity statute need not matter to a court
in another state. But the fact is that Nevada had waived its immunity—although Nevada capped its waiver at the then-meager figure
50
of $25,000. California was free to ignore Nevada’s $25,000 cap.
Every state is always free to apply its own law to the question of the

40. Id.
41. Hall v. Univ. of Nev., 414 U.S. 820 (1973).
42. All online calculators consulted conclude that the amount of the 1972 jury award
would be about $5,550,000 in 2019 dollars.
43. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 427 (affirming the California judgment below).
44. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.)
(referring to “postulates which limit and control” and holding a state immune from suit in
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, although in terms such suit is available under Article III, if the action is brought by a foreign state).
45. 440 U.S. at 424.
46. Id. at 427. Rehnquist did not become Chief Justice until 1985.
47. Id. at 432.
48. On the paucity of cases, see supra notes 4, 8 and accompanying text.
49. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (2019).
50. Id.
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51
immunity vel non of another state. The Nevada “cap” could not tie
California’s hands to defeat California’s own compensatory and
deterrent interests. California, as the place of wrongful conduct,
the place of injury, and the residence of the plaintiff, had every interest in taking jurisdiction. And it was entitled to deploy its own
52
tort law on the merits—as Justice Stevens pointed out. California
law, like the law of every state in the Union, provides compensation
and deterrence for a tort on the state’s own roads injuring the
state’s own residents.
53
Interestingly, in the later case of Alden v. Maine, in extending
federal sovereign immunity to a state in an action under federal
law in the state’s own courts, the Supreme Court had not overruled
54
Nevada v. Hall, but had distinguished it. Although the Alden Court,
by Justice Kennedy, ruled that a state cannot be sued in its own
courts without its consent, even to enforce an act of Congress, a
55
state could nevertheless be sued in a sister state. Justice Kennedy saw
that the sister state would have policies and interests of its own to
vindicate.
Franchise III overrules Alden on that point.

B. Franchise Tax Board
Now let us turn to the interesting litigation in Franchise Tax
Board v. Hyatt. This case, which wound up in the Supreme Court
three times, was there first in 2003 (Franchise I). 56 In this case, it was
a Nevada court that took jurisdiction over California. The tables were
turned.
Gilbert P. Hyatt (no connection with the hotels) is a man of considerable wealth, the inventor of a useful computer chip. It seems
clear that Mr. Hyatt moved to Nevada to avoid California’s high
taxes. According to California’s taxing authority, the Franchise Tax

51. For the general rule denying power to a defendant sovereign to immunize itself in
the courts of another sovereign, see infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.1.
52. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 426–27 (discussing California’s compensatory and regulatory interests).
53. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
54. Id. at 738–39 (distinguishing and saving Nevada v. Hall).
55. Id.
56. Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003) (O’Connor, J. for a unanimous court) (holding, under Nevada v. Hall, that Nevada could take jurisdiction over California); id. at 496–97
(declining to distinguish between governmental functions and non-governmental functions). Salient distinctions, not acknowledged and thus not addressed by Justice O’Connor,
would seem to be, first, the distinction between unintentional and intentional torts; second,
the distinction between ordinary workers and officials; third, the distinction between breach
of a duty pleadable as an ordinary tort and breach of a constitutional duty; and fourth, the
distinction between personal misconduct and state action.
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Board, Mr. Hyatt left California allegedly owing that sunny state
57
some $13 million. Hyatt denied this, insisting that he was fully
paid up when he left California. It all depended on the date of Hyatt’s move to Nevada. But this Nevada case was not about any of
that.
Now living in Nevada, Hyatt was fighting back with a grievance
of his own. While continuing his battle with California’s tax collectors in California, he filed suit against California’s Franchise Tax
Board in Nevada, complaining of abuses in Nevada by California’s
auditors.
Could Hyatt have sued in California? This question was posed by
58
Justice Sotomayor during oral argument. With her customary insight, she pointed out that the availability of a remedy at home implied that the sovereign immunity issue lacked substance. But for
those who might read her question as a suggestion that Hyatt ought
to have sued at home, it will be helpful to point out that Hyatt’s
Nevada suit was not about taxes in California—the subject of his
59
ongoing struggle back in California—but about a tort in Nevada.
Were Hyatt’s claims frivolous? He alleged that the California tax
auditors came after him extraterritorially in Nevada and engaged
there in a course of harassment and abusive misconduct, intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon him. The Nevada jury
60
found most of this to be true.
It was the audit from hell. The California auditors peered
through his windows. They read his mail. They rummaged through
his garbage. They lied to him about the confidentiality of some of
his information and then released that confidential information to
the very persons with whom he did not want to share it. They delayed resolution of his protests. They intruded into his place of
work, rummaging through his files. They bustled noisily into his
synagogue. They made disparaging remarks about his religion.
Perhaps the unkindest cut was their seeking out and questioning
Hyatt’s estranged relatives. Witnesses testified that Hyatt’s emotional distress was patent, that he was drinking heavily, and that he
suffered severe migraine headaches and abdominal pains. In sum,
57. Hyatt eventually wound up substantially victorious in his California tax dispute,
agreeing to pay $2 million to California. See Zach Weissmueller, California Tried To Seize Millions of This Inventor’s Fortune. He Fought Back. And Won., REASON (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://reason.com/archives/2017/10/23/gilbert-hyatts-25-year-battle-against-ca/print
[https://perma.cc/9STM-5MJ8].
58. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488 (No. 02-42), 2003 WL
439743.
59. On the congeries of immunities arguably involved in the case, see infra text accompanying notes 62–65.
60. 335 P.3d 125 (Nev. 2014) (working throughout with the evidence and the damages
the jury awarded on each count of the complaint).
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a jury could find that the California auditors invaded Hyatt’s privacy, destroyed his peace, and intentionally inflicted the alleged
emotional distress.
Conceivably, Hyatt’s case could have been pleaded as one of
constitutional tort. Intentional infliction of harm by a government
61
official, in my view, is unconstitutional. Perhaps, at a stretch, it
was an unconstitutional search within the broader reaches of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. It could have been pleaded,
I suppose, as an extension of the constitutional right of privacy,
although that has been deployed mostly in aid of family autonomy.
But the gravamen of Hyatt’s complaint was an infliction of emotional distress, a state common-law tort.
Now consider the legal position of the defendant of record, California’s Franchise Tax Board, an arm of the state of California.
62
Under the California Tort Claims Act (a typical workaround enacted to deal with improvidently enacted state immunity), the
state’s government employees become immune. But the state itself
waives its immunity, appears, defends, and pays any judgment.
That is a mechanism roughly analogous to that of the Federal Tort
63
Claims Act, and, like that statute, it is also available in some cases
of intentional tort, such as Mr. Hyatt’s.
There may have been some confusion among the judges and
lawyers throughout this Nevada litigation, not only about the California Tort Claims Act but also about California’s additional separate special statutory immunity for its tax collectors, the Franchise
64
Tax Board and its agents. California law immunizes California’s
tax collectors, confiding complaints against them to their administrative agency, the Franchise Tax Board. But this latter immunity

61. The Supreme Court has carved out exceptions. The Court reasons that some intentional torts by a government official are best left to state law—libel, for example. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
62. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 810–810.8 (West 2012) (dealing with the liabilities in tort and
contract of California’s administrative agencies); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 900–998.3 (West
2012) (California Tort Claims Act); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 860.2 (West 2012) (California’s limited immunity for tax officials).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), as amended by the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (dealing with
ordinary common-law torts by federal workers in the course of their employment). The
Westfall Act, inter alia, codifies the general rule that the Federal Tort Claims Act has no extraterritorial effect. In my view, a little further thought would have cautioned Congress
against this codification. The interests of the United States in sensible management of ordinary government torts are heightened by our need to maintain good foreign relations when
an American civilian officer commits a tort causing injury abroad.
64. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 860.2 (“Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by: (a) Instituting any judicial or administrative proceeding or action for or incidental to the assessment or collection of a tax. (b) An act or omission in the
interpretation or application of any law relating to a tax.”).
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applies only to disputes over the calculation and amount of taxes
65
owed. It has no bearing on a question of tort liability.
The Nevada court apparently assumed that California’s waiver of
immunity under its Tort Claims Act was effective in Nevada, just as
it would have been at home in California, immunizing the auditors
in the case and putting the state itself in their place as the defendant. The Californians apparently made the same assumption. In
any event, California did not plead sovereign immunity in Nevada.
Instead, California came up with an unconvincing argument that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause required Nevada to give California
the benefit of Nevada’s $25,000 cap on its own waiver of immuni66
ty. This argument was nonsense. The obligation of full faith and
credit is an obligation concerning judgments. The obligation has
67
long been understood as having little or no bearing on laws.
Moreover, the Clause imposes on the forum an obligation to a sister
state, not to the forum itself. In other words, the Clause requires
that the judgment of a sister state be recognized and enforced at
the forum state. Further, the Clause empowers Congress to deter68
mine the extent of that obligation. Congress has enacted the Full
Faith and Credit Act, which provides that the scope of a judgment
69
is determined by the law of the judgment-rendering state. Nothing in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, or its implementing statute,
requires a court to apply another state’s laws, and certainly nothing
70
in these measures requires a state to apply its own law.

65. See Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1133 (1986). In the Franchise Tax
Board litigation in Nevada, the California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 800–810.8,
900–998.3 (West 2012), may have been misunderstood among the welter of the Code’s various exceptions and immunity provisions. The statutory scheme involves exceptions to exceptions and contains special immunities in tax cases. My reading is that the taxing agency,
Franchise Tax Board, as an arm of the state, and the State of California itself, are each immune to judicial adjudication of disputes concerning the tax itself and its computation. Litigation over the tax and its computation is confided to the agency. See CAL. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 860.2 (West 2012). But for torts by tax officials, having nothing to do with their calculation
of taxes owed, the California Tort Claims Act governs. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 800–810.8 (West
2012). Under this provision, California immunizes its officials, waives its own immunity, appears, defends, and pays any judgment.
66. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.031–.970 (2019).
67. On the inapplicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to laws (as opposed to
judgments), see Justice O’Connor’s clarification of the point and Justice Stone’s view, infra
note 76. See also Chief Justice Roberts to the same effect, infra note 89. For the classic exposition of the position that nothing need displace the forum’s own policies, see Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (Holmes, J.).
68. U.S. CONST. art IV.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. For the early history and evolution of the Full Faith and Credit
statute, before and after the initial Act of 1790, see the excellent study in Stephen E. Sachs,
Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201 (2009).
70. See Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935); Pac.
Emp. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939).
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But by the time Franchise Tax Board reached the United States
Supreme Court, California was not only making its spurious argument under the Full Faith and Credit Clause but also attacking Nevada v. Hall, arguing that a state should not be permitted to haul a
sister state into its courts. In 2003, in Franchise I, the Supreme
Court sustained Nevada’s jurisdiction and remanded the case for
71
trial. On this point of jurisdiction, Justice O’Connor’s Franchise I
72
opinion for a unanimous Court was based on Nevada v. Hall.
California argued, in the alternative, that Nevada v. Hall could
be distinguished—that a tax audit, being part of tax collection, is a
“core sovereign function” and that this distinguished the case from
73
Nevada v. Hall. In oral argument, Justice O’Connor wondered
whether driving a car on official business might be a “core sovereign function” just as well as conducting a tax audit. 74 Justice
O’Connor could have been helped here by recognizing that the
act of driving a state car recklessly, however “core” a “sovereign
function,” cannot be pleaded as though negligent driving were unconstitutional. At least since the days of the Burger Court, a plead75
ing of a constitutional tort requires an allegation of intentionality.
Moreover, the defendant in a constitutional case must be an official, rather than an ordinary worker, an official with a power of governmental action in some degree, and the official’s breach must be a
breach of a constitutional duty. Bad driving by a government worker
is not unconstitutional, whereas intentional mistreatment by a government official is.
In her opinion for the Court, Justice O’Connor also declined
the invitation to “balance” competing state interests under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause in order to impose a particular state’s law
76
on any case.

71. Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488 (2003) (holding that, under Nevada v. Hall, Nevada could
take jurisdiction over California, and nothing in the Full Faith and Credit Clause compelled
Nevada to give California the benefit of Nevada’s $25,000 cap on Nevada’s own waiver of
sovereign immunity).
72. Id. at 497. Among the other distinctions of Justice O’Connor’s opinion was her refined understanding of the immunity tangle confronting the Nevada Supreme Court. She
wrote, “The Nevada Supreme Court sensitively applied comity principles with a healthy regard for California’s sovereign status, relying on the contours of Nevada’s own sovereign
immunity from suit as a benchmark for its analysis.” Id. at 499.
73. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488 (No. 02-42), 2003 WL
439743.
74. Franchise I, 538 U.S. at 498.
75. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that a zoning ordinance with a discriminatory effect was not unconstitutional because
there was no showing of discriminatory intent).
76. As Justice O’Connor pointed out, the Court had long ago “abandoned the balancing-of-interests approach to [a] conflict[] of law[s] under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”
Franchise I, 538 U.S. at 496 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981)
(plurality opinion); Pac. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501
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The Nevada jury awarded Hyatt damages of nearly $500 million.
Yes, a half-billion dollars. Nevada’s high court threw cold water on
such enthusiasm. By the time the Nevada high court was through
with the case, the jury’s award was reduced to a less unreasonable
$1 million. The Nevada high court ruled that Hyatt had no legitimate expectation of privacy in certain features of the tax audit at
issue, so damages for invasion of privacy were wiped out. In addition, there could be no recovery for mere negligence; the case was
one of intentional tort. So the damages for negligence were wiped
out. And in the interest of comity, the Nevada Supreme Court
77
chose (in my view, properly) not to approve punitive damages.
I pause to note that prohibition of punitive damages is the gen78
eral rule in cases against a government. For what it is worth, however, I should add that Congress specifically provides for punitive
damages against the Internal Revenue Service for deliberate or
79
reckless disclosures of private information. And in Hyatt’s case,
there was such a claim, which was also disallowed by the Nevada
80
Supreme Court. The Nevada high court also suspended further
consideration of Hyatt’s chief claim, intentional infliction of emo(1939); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–19 (1985)). Indeed, ever since 1935
it has been clear that there can be no obligation of full faith and credit to laws. The only
obligation is to judgments. See Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547 (Stone, J.) (“A rigid and literal
enforcement of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, without regard to the statute of the forum,
would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state
must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.”).
77. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 130 Nev. 662, 705 n.19 (2014) (denying punitive damages).
78. I note that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611, makes an appropriate exception to the rule against punitive damages in suits against government. The exception approves punitive damages
against foreign state supporters of terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A; see infra notes 114, 151, 225.
Apart from that anti-terrorism exception, the more general rule of the Act provides that
a foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable
for punitive damages; if, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law
of the place where the action or omission occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign state shall be
liable for actual or compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death which were incurred by the persons for whose benefit the
action was brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1606. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that “The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (emphasis added). Punitive damages are unavailable in actions against cities. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247, 268 (1981).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 7431(c)(1)(B)(ii).
80. Hyatt’s allegation of “fraud” involved assurances of confidentiality by the California
auditors, assurances on which he relied in supplying certain information. Franchise Tax Bd.,
130 Nev. at 669–70. Hyatt alleged that the California agents deceived him and that they
“shared his personal information not only with newspapers but also with his business contacts and even his place of worship.” Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1284 (2016).
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tional distress, mandating that on remand it be sent to the jury on
corrected instructions.
Most remaining damages were remittitured, bringing recovery
81
down to that more plausible million. What turned out to be important in all this was the Nevada high court’s instruction to the
trial court that it need not give California the benefit of Nevada’s
82
cap on its waiver of immunity —now amended to the still-lessthan-handsome figure of $50,000. This instruction, in my view, was
quite sound. To apply the Nevada legislature’s protection for Nevada to every other state in the Union would take the cap outside
its rational scope, and in this case would needlessly impede effectuation of Nevada’s tort policies as the place of wrongful conduct
and injury.
Once again, California sought review in the United States Supreme Court. In this 2016 phase of the litigation (Franchise II), the
83
eight-Justice Supreme Court split 4:4 on the question whether to
84
overrule Nevada v. Hall and, thus, sustained Nevada’s jurisdiction.
But in a strange opinion for the Court, Justice Breyer ruled, apparently for the first time in American legal history, that a state is re85
quired to give full faith and credit to its own law. And thus, Nevada was required, irrationally, to give California the benefit of
Nevada’s own cap on Nevada’s own waiver of Nevada’s own immunity. This limited California’s liability to $50,000.
Justice Breyer evidently was encouraged in his novel view of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause by his perception of “hostility” on the
86
part of the Nevada courts. For this “hostility” point, Justice Breyer

81. Franchise Tax Bd., 130 Nev. at 669. In 2015, in oral argument in Franchise II, Justice
Sotomayor stated that recovery was then down to “$100,000” (query whether she meant to
refer to the $1 million remaining in the case at that time, or whether the Court had been
apprised that a settlement might have been reached in such an amount, or was under some
misapprehension). Justice Sotomayor suggested that that sum was for “the attorneys.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (No. 14-1175), 2015 WL
9304859.
82. See Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1280.
83. On the eight-justice Court, see supra notes 17, 20 and accompanying text.
84. Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1283. I note that, somewhat surprisingly, the Justices have
been shifting back in forth in their views of these cases. Back in 1979, the liberal Justices had
supported Nevada v. Hall, while three of the conservatives dissented. Both wings of the Court
fell in with the unanimous opinion in 2003 in Franchise I. But in 2016, in Franchise II, the liberals joined Justice Breyer’s opinion requiring Nevada to give California the benefit of Nevada’s $50,000 cap on its waiver of immunity and finding “hostility” in the Nevada Supreme
Court’s correct instruction to the court below not to apply the $50,000 cap. And the conservatives in 2016 were supportive of Nevada v. Hall, except for Justice Alito, who concurred
in the judgment.
85. Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1280–81 (Breyer, J.) (holding that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause required Nevada to apply its own law).
86. Id. at 1281 (Breyer, J.) (noting “hostility” in the Nevada courts).
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87
cited the old case of Carroll v. Lanza. The Court in Carroll v. Lanza
had casually remarked that, in the presence of hostility, the forum
might be required to apply a sister state’s law as well as to recog88
nize its judgments. The Court in Lanza did not say that in the
presence of hostility a court could be required to apply its own law.
Lanza did not require a state to do anything against its own policies
and interests. To these clear understandings there is one vital exception—that a state must recognize and enforce the judgment of
89
90
a sister state. There is no obligation to enforce sister state laws.
Lawyers continue to argue for nonforum law under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, and the Court does not bother to correct
them, but the Court will not apply the Full Faith and Credit Clause
to resolve a conflict of laws. For the latter purpose, the Court will
91
consult only what the Due Process Clause requires. The modern
position, under the Due Process Clause, is that the law applied
92
must be rational as to its source as well as its content —that is, the
law applied must be that of a state with a legitimate governmental
interest in the application on the particular facts. There is no constitutional requirement that, in a two-state case, an interested forum apply the other state’s law, even if the other state is also, on
the particular facts, an interested one. As Justice (later Chief Jus93
94
tice ) Stone explained way back in 1938 in the Alaska Packers case,

87. 349 U.S. 408 (1955) (Douglas, J.) (mentioning “hostility” as a possible exception to
the obligation of full faith and credit. Id. at 413. But the Court found no hostility in that
case. “[T]he State of the forum, is not adopting any policy of hostility to the public Acts of
Missouri. It is choosing to apply its own rule of law to give affirmative relief for an action
arising within its borders.” Id.
88. Id.
89. As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, dissenting in Franchise II on the issue of full
faith and credit, the full faith and credit obligation is an obligation to a sister state, not to the
forum state itself. Id. at 1284; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. In the Supreme Court, the Full Faith
and Credit Clause is resignedly applied to laws when lawyers argue it on a choice-of-law
point, but only to the extent that the Due Process Clause would require. Choice of law has
long been solely under due process control since the 1930s. What due process requires in a
choice of law is a rational basis—a legitimate governmental interest. The interested forum
need never bow to another interested state’s laws. See Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident
Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). See also leading cases to the same effect under both the
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, infra note 91. The full faith and credit obligation is to judgments, not laws. 136 S. Ct. at 1283–84 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
90. Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. at 1283–84 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
91. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818, 823 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981); Pac. Emp. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306
U.S. 493, 501 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass’n, 294 U.S. at 547.
92. For the foundational case on the due process requirement of rationality in choices
of law, see Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) (Brandeis, J.). A similar perspective on Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Brandeis, J.), is offered in Louise Weinberg, A
General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057
(2013).
93. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone was appointed Chief Justice, with the consent of the Senate, by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1941. Stone served as Chief Justice until his
death in 1946. Harlan Fiske Stone, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography
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to hold otherwise would produce the “absurd” result that in every
two-state case the forum must apply the law of the other state but
95
never its own.
Perhaps Justice Breyer (understandably) was shocked by the
amount of the jury’s original half-billion dollar award to Hyatt.
Perhaps Justice Breyer simply did not believe the allegations of the
complaint, the jury verdict to the contrary notwithstanding. Perhaps he reacted negatively to Mr. Hyatt’s move to Nevada in obvious tax avoidance. But tax avoidance is legal, after all. And the
right to move to another state surely is a cherished freedom our
federalism affords all Americans. It is reflected in our “right to
travel”—a right held to be protected by the Privileges and Immuni96
ties Clause of Article IV.
So it was that, as far as damages are concerned, the Court’s liberals in Franchise II wound up favoring an abusive agency over an
97
individual whose peace the agency had intentionally destroyed.
But at least Nevada v. Hall was intact—the 4:4 split in the Court
98
meant that Nevada v. Hall was let stand.
In the final act in the drama, in Franchise III, the curtain opened
on California doggedly fighting on to wipe out the last $50,000 of
Mr. Hyatt’s jury award. At stake was not only the bare justice afforded Mr. Hyatt on the facts of outrageous government misconduct as found by a jury. At stake also were the remedial mechanisms that Nevada v. Hall and Franchise I had made available. If
Nevada v. Hall fell, Franchise I would fall with it.
But now, in Franchise III, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was no
longer available to California. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
had furnished California’s constitutional argument in Franchise I in

/Harlan-Fiske-Stone [https://perma.cc/T4TV-ZAYW]; LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER (1994), Table of the
Justices, app. F, at F-1.
94. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 294 U.S. at 547. This language was later quoted by Chief Justice
Roberts in his dissenting opinion in Franchise II. 136 S. Ct. at 1285 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
95. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 294 U.S. at 547; see also, e.g., Pac. Emps., 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
cases cited supra notes 76, 88–92, 94.
96. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2; Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55 (1982); cf. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188 (1947).
97. This is not the first time the Court’s liberals have been protective of an abusive federal agency. One thinks, for example, of the regrettable case of Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541
(2012) (Ginsburg, J., for a unanimous Court) (denying dependent children access to their
Social Security support, in effect because they were born in vitro). In denying support to the
children, the unanimous Astrue Court impoverished the entire family, in the teeth of the
purposes of the legislation, enacted in the second trough of the Great Depression in 1938.
For a possible explanation for the liberals’ occasional tolerance of illiberal outcomes, see
infra Part IX.
98. Justice Alito concurred without opinion.
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99
100
2003, and that argument had been victorious in Franchise II.
The Supreme Court had given California’s tax agency all it had so
implausibly asked for. There was nothing more that the Supreme
Court could do for California in Franchise III under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
However, California’s actual question had always been the question whether one state could take jurisdiction over another. In
Franchise III, California simply raised the question directly. There
was nothing in the Constitution that seemed to answer that question, yet some federal question was needed to gain Supreme Court
review once more. In its petition for certiorari in Franchise III, California adroitly posed the question as: whether Nevada v. Hall
101
should be overruled. California had succeeded finally in raising
the real question the earlier iterations of the case had attempted to
raise. That is, should one state be allowed to take jurisdiction over
another?
Justice Thomas, writing for a slim conservative majority in Franchise III and under the necessity of explaining why the Court’s answer was “No,” was in the same quandary in which California’s legal
team had found itself. The Court could not overrule Nevada v. Hall
without finding some reason for doing so in the Constitution,
preferably, or in some federal statute. With full faith and credit out
of the case, Thomas needed to find some other ground for the
Court’s decision. He could not rely on the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause, not in this case. A defendant is not
denied due process simply because he comes within the jurisdiction of a court. A defendant state that has waived immunity cannot
credibly argue that jurisdiction over it, and nothing more, violates
the Due Process Clause. At all events, the unvarnished question of
state immunity in state-law cases in state courts would seem to be reserved to the states, within the meaning of the Tenth Amendment,
102
since the Constitution nowhere delegates it to the nation. As Justice Breyer would point out, dissenting in Franchise III (in some

99. Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003).
100. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411 (1979). Full faith and credit is owed to judgments,
not laws. Lawyers often get this wrong, but the Court traditionally decides questions so argued by considering the rational bases—governmental interests—supporting the choice of
law, exactly as it would decide them under the Due Process Clause. The forum is always free
to apply its own law and policy, but due process requires that the application be within the
law’s rational scope. Nevada’s waiver of immunity up to the amount of its statutory cap cannot waive any other state’s immunity or cap any other state’s waiver. Construction of law, as
well as choice of law, as well as application of law—all must be rational. See Louise Weinberg,
A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057
(2013).
101. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Franchise II, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (No. 14-1175),
2015 WL 1346455.
102.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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tension with his views in Franchise II), “Compelling states to grant
immunity to their sister states would risk interfering with sovereign
103
rights that the Tenth Amendment leaves to the states.”
With no constitutional texts on which to draw, what was left to
Justice Thomas was the massive body of Supreme Court cases expanding state sovereign immunity. He had at his disposal the researches and arguments made in those prior cases. We will have a
closer look at his opinion shortly. Here, it is sufficient to say that
Justice Thomas held, for the Court, that Nevada v. Hall was overruled, and that the Constitution requires every state court to bow
104
to the immunity of every other state.
In August 2019, Franchise III was back in the Nevada courts. In
view of the overrule of Nevada v. Hall, the Nevada Supreme Court
had no alternative. It remanded the case to the court below for va105
catement of Mr. Hyatt’s judgment.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TORT AND ORDINARY TORT:
TWO DIFFERENT WRONGS, TWO DIFFERENT REMEDIES
It will be helpful here to limn out the two novel, serviceable, but
very different remedial mechanisms deployed by the trial courts in
our two cases.
We have seen that, in the Franchise Tax Board litigation, the Supreme Court had before it a case very different from the case of
Nevada v. Hall. It is not the only salient difference between them
106
that Franchise Tax Board grew out of a “core sovereign function,” a
tax audit, while Nevada v. Hall grew out of a two-car collision, a
road accident. An equally important distinction between the two is
the fact that the tort in Franchise Tax Board, unlike the tort in Nevada v. Hall, was intentional. Deliberate misconduct by a government
official, when causing injury or threatening to cause it, in my view
107
is unconstitutional. Furthermore, in Nevada v. Hall the offending
driver was a worker, with some quotidian job to do, whereas in Franchise Tax Board, the offending auditors were officials, capable of
governmental action. The case against the worker will be for some
103. Dean Chemerinsky raised the point in oral argument, but it met with no particular
interest. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, 31, Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (No.
17-1299), 2019 WL 144815.
104. Franchise III, 139 U.S. at 1498 (Thomas, J.) (ruling that “[t]he Constitution implicitly strips States of any power they once had to refuse each other sovereign immunity”).
105. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 445 P.3d 1250 (Nev. 2019) (unpublished disposition).
106. See Franchise I, 538 U.S. 488, 496 (2003) (noting that a tax audit might not qualify
as a “core sovereign function” when it was as abusive as Hyatt’s).
107. But see, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
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common-law tort, but the case against the official, when for intentional injurious misgovernance, can be pleaded as a breach of constitutional duty.
These differences suggest that the remedial options the Court
108
struck down as unconstitutional in Franchise III had been usefully
closing not one but two different remedial gaps of some consequence in our adjudicatory system. These would have furnished forums for litigation of the interstate torts of government workers
and the intentional interstate torts of government officials, respectively. The former is generally pleadable under state common law;
the latter is generally pleadable under the Constitution.
The two cases did share valuable features. In both cases, state law
had immunized the state employee, protecting her from damages
that she could not pay. In both cases, state statutes immunized the
state’s employees and waived state immunity. And in both cases, the
state itself appeared and defended. In both cases the courts were
familiar with such arrangements and comfortable with them. The
reader will recognize at once the typical workings of tort claims
acts.
A. Nevada v. Hall: A Non-Federal Interstate
Tort Claims “Act” at Common Law
With Nevada v. Hall, interstate government torts in cases of personal injury, previously in a legal no-man’s-land, became actionable.
This was a great achievement of the common law. Utilizing state
common law, Nevada v. Hall was functioning, in effect, as an interstate non-federal tort claims “act” at common law, analogous to the Fed109
eral Tort Claims Act and like typical “little” state tort claims
110
acts.

108. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. at 1490 (2019) (Thomas, J.) (“This case, now before us for
the third time, requires us to decide whether the Constitution permits a state to be sued by a
private party without its consent in the courts of a different state. We hold that it does not
and overrule our decision to the contrary in Nevada v. Hall.”) (emphasis added and citation
omitted).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
110. For a useful chart describing the parameters of state tort liability for each of the 50
states, see State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT &
LEHRER, S.C. (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02
/STATE-SOVEREIGN-IMMUNITY-AND-TORT-LIABILITY-CHART.pdf [https://perma.cc
/QT97-M64D]. The foregoing chart, though quite comprehensive and detailed, is nevertheless limited in an important way. It often happens that a statute of immunity contains a
clause that excepts the provisions of other legislation. It is often in this other legislation that
state liability is made plain. On the other hand, the chart’s inclusion of caps on damages
also will reveal the fact of liability, where the statutory scheme, at first examination, appears
to be one of immunity. Assuming the correctness and currency of the chart, apparently
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A tort claims act usually protects government workers, immunizing from liability a government employee who has committed an
ordinary tort when acting within the scope of her employment.
State mail-room clerks, truck drivers, and secretaries cannot easily
pay damages. When a claim against such a worker is for personal
injuries or wrongful death, the sums involved cannot be collected
as a practical matter. Such workers are substantially judgmentproof. It would be a nightmare for them to be made judgment
debtors, in effect for life, or to have to seek relief in bankruptcy.
Nor can workers do their jobs very well if stressed by having to
mount a defense they cannot afford and by the threat of a judgment for damages they cannot pay. A tort claims act protects the
government worker from all of this, remitting her, for any discipline or penalty, to the internal affairs desk of her office. The government, in effect, acknowledges its responsibility of supervision
and training and, in turn, is encouraged to exercise those powers
more effectually.
Even when a state statute will permit suits against state employees for their ordinary torts in the course of their employment, the
111
state typically will indemnify the employee, or it will provide
course-of-employment liability insurance. Insurance can insulate a
state from fully absorbing the costs of a particular accident and
avoids letting the risk fall on the low-paid employee, which, as a
practical matter, will actually fall on the injured party. The costs of
insurance are spread across the public in a state’s current budget.
The insurance company settles and, when necessary, comes in and
defends.
The wisdom of such mechanisms becomes even plainer as one
recognizes that, in this way, access to courts and to justice is provided—the injured party is given a chance to prove her case. Yet,
even if she succeeds, she is afforded only the same rights—or almost the same rights—that she would have had in a similar action
112
against a private defendant. Thus, the costs of her own injury will
some twenty-nine states have tort claims acts with varying limits and qualifications. Almost all
remaining states appear to have functionally equivalent remedial mechanisms.
111. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 885 (2014)
(concluding that “[g]overnments paid approximately 99.98% of the dollars that plaintiffs
recovered in lawsuits alleging civil rights violations by law enforcement”).
112. The important paradigm is provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act, which requires
application of the law of the state where the wrongful act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b). This was Congress’s attempt to ensure that a plaintiff under the Act would have the
same rights under state law as she would have enjoyed in an action against a private defendant. By use of the word “state,” an exception was made for cases that otherwise would have
been governed by foreign law; accidents abroad are not covered. This exception is now codified by the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). At the time of the original enactment of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, every state in the Union applied the law of the place of injury to a
tort claim. That might not be the same as the place of “act or omission,” the law of which is
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not fall on the plaintiff and her innocent dependents as they would
in the absence of a tort claims act. In some cases costs would also
be borne by unpaid medical services or local charities. Such dysfunction would be the consequence of an attempt to impose liability on a state wage worker in the absence of a tort claims act. The
states typically achieve more orderly, commonsense management
of their employees’ torts. Under a typical tort claims act, the state
itself, waiving its formal immunity, settles the claim or comes in
113
and defends and pays any judgment. The plaintiff has her day in
court and her chance to be compensated in damages for her injury. This is the needed mechanism Nevada v. Hall was supplying in
cases of interstate government tort, cases in which the injurer was a
nonresident government worker.
What about runaway juries? In the analogous statutory schemes,
a runaway jury is constrained by the typical proscription of punitive
114
damages against government. Some of the relevant statutes further limit damages to economic losses only or to “actual” damages,
which can be defined to eliminate grief or suffering.
The mechanism of a tort claims act has clearly proved its worth.
115
116
117
Twenty-nine states, California and Nevada among them, have
enacted their own tort claims acts. Neither statute was applicable in
these cases. The home state is under no duty to apply the other
state’s law, and the home state’s law is inapplicable to the other
state’s workers. In Nevada v. Hall, California’s tort claims act was a
required by the statute. Thus, a statute intended to treat the victim of a federal worker’s tort
exactly the way she would be treated in an ordinary state-law case, was turning out, in a twostate case, to shunt her case into some other state’s law. The Supreme Court straightened
this out in Richards v. United States. 369 U.S. 1 (1962) (holding artfully that Congress’s reference to the state of wrongful act or omission was a reference to that state’s whole law, including its choice rules). This renvoi got the statute back to the place of injury. The default position
under the proposed Restatement (Third) of Conflict of Laws is the place of conduct, not
necessarily the place of injury. It is a plausible choice, and the better choice from a regulatory point of view; but if widely adopted it will undo the benefit of Richards, to the extent
courts still are applying the place-of-injury rule, in securing the same rights to the federal
plaintiff that she would have enjoyed under state law—as Congress intended. Notwithstanding the complexities of modern approaches to choice of law in tort cases, it seems fair to say
that, for better or worse, the law of the place of injury remains the predominant choice.
113. Thus, tort claims acts are a roundabout way of providing respondeat superior against
government, when case law has balked it. For a fine recognition of this situation and a recommendation that respondeat superior be restored outright to defeat government immunity,
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933
(2019).
114. For statutory shielding of sovereign entities from punitive damages, see Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, proscribing punitive damages; Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1606, same; and compare Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125, 131
(Nev. 2014), in action defended by the state of California, state supreme court in another
state disallowing punitive damages in the interest of “comity.”
115. On the 29 states, see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
116. CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 810–996.
117. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.010–41.970 (2019).

FALL 2020] Sovereign Immunity and Interstate Government Tort

25

regulation of California employees and did not apply to Nevada’s
employee. California’s waiver of sovereign immunity could not rationally be construed to insulate Nevada from liability. Similarly, in
Franchise Tax Board, Nevada’s immunity rules could not apply to
118
California and California’s law was not mandatory in Nevada. But
both states’ courts treated the cases in their customary way as
standard tort claims act cases.
Nevada v. Hall, then, was providing an obviously useful and even
necessary adjunct to justice, extending to the interstate case the
usual methods of litigation of ordinary tort claims by government
workers. It would seem to be well, from either conservative or liberal points of view, that some such commonsense path be laid for
orderly administration of civil cases of this kind, in interstate as
well as intrastate cases.
B. Franchise Tax Board: A Non-Federal Interstate Civil Rights “Act” at
Common Law
With Franchise I, interstate constitutional torts, previously in a legal no-man’s land, became actionable. I say “constitutional” because
intentional injurious misconduct by a government official within
the scope of her office will often be pleadable as a violation of the
Constitution, although Franchise I was pleaded as an ordinary tort.
Thus, Franchise I was another great achievement of the common
law, one which Nevada v. Hall had made possible.
What about the Civil Rights Act? It is customary to plead intentional injurious misconduct by a state official under the Civil Rights
119
Act of 1871. True, the Supreme Court has held that a state is not
120
a “person” within the meaning of the statute, but that rule is a
party-of-record rule only. An officer suit pleaded in the officer’s
121
individual capacity will defeat that rule. The greater difficulty is
that civil rights actions have become virtually unenforceable any-

118. A state’s legislature does not legislate for all states but only its own. A Nevada speed
limit is hardly intended to apply on a California road, and Nevada’s state immunity cap can
hardly be bestowed on California. The Nevada Supreme Court was correct in pointing this
out to the court below on remand. It explains why Justice Breyer was incorrect in finding
hostility in Nevada’s doing so, particularly since the same court disallowed punitive damages
and threw out the bulk of ordinary damages in the case.
119. Today the substantive part of the Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
120. Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1989).
121. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25–31 (1991); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974).
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way, under such doctrines as so-called “official” or “qualified” im122
munity.
Ultimately, the Franchise Tax Board litigation is best read as if the
courts and parties in that case were applying defendant California’s tort claims act, which waived state sovereign immunity.
C. A Background Case.
Armed with the Supreme Court’s own jurisprudence, Justice
Thomas was content to take the question as posed in California’s
123
petition for certiorari —the vague but broad question whether the
Constitution permits a state to take jurisdiction over another state.
And he had, for this broad question, a surprisingly broad answer.
His answer would not only upend Nevada v. Hall but every other
case against a state—not only in a sister state but even in a state’s
124
own courts. After Franchise III, it becomes quite possible to argue
that a state is protected from all litigation by federal sovereign im125
munity.

122. In the midst of world-wide protests over the killing of George Floyd, who died with
an officer’s knee on his neck long after his pleas for breath had ceased, the Supreme Court,
in a supreme act of disregard, on June 15, 2020, denied certiorari in four cases seeking reconsideration of qualified immunity. See Qualified Immunity Cases Are Rejected, WALL ST. J. (June 6,
2020), at A2. For an influential extensive critique of the defense of qualified immunity, see
Thompson v. Clark, No. 14-CV-7349, 2018 WL 3128975, at *6–13 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (Weinstein,
Sr., J.); see also the fine portfolio work of Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120
COLUM. L. REV. 309 (2020); Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, 114 NW.
U. L. REV. 1101 (2020); and Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018). The leading case today remains Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 815 (1982). Harlow departs from the earlier police defense of good faith and probable cause, ruling, rather, that a government actor is immune if a reasonable such officer
could not have known that her conduct was in violation of “clearly established” law. In practice, after further development, this has come to mean that the plaintiff must find some previous precedent establishing that the same conduct was unconstitutional. But what two cases
were ever the same? Worse, qualified immunity became litigable only pretrial, to save the
officer the burden of meritless litigation, thus ousting the plaintiff of the right to trial by jury
on the one issue that has become dispositive. All this dysfunction is attributable to the Supreme Court, fantasizing that a police officer must be spared the burdens of litigation and
judgment, when in fact the defendant officer will be indemnified, or the city will waive immunity and defend instead. But see Daniel Epps, Opinion, Abolishing Qualified Immunity Is
Unlikely to Alter Police Behavior, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/06/16/opinion/police-qualified-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/JG34-T4TT] (concluding that abolishing qualified immunity will not improve police behavior because police officers are indemnified for their liabilities in over 99% of cases).
123. For California’s petition for certiorari, see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
124. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019).
125. Perhaps we should not be too surprised by Thomas’s sweeping conception of state
immunity. Consider the fact that suit against any federal official for constitutional tort has
become unavailable as a practical matter. In effect, there seems to be immunity—impunity,
in fact—for federal officials violation the Constitution. It has been decades since the Supreme Court has approved a Bivens suit. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (making cognizable at common law a suit against a
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Lurking in the background for Justice Thomas was the Court’s
126
seriously wrong 1999 decision in Alden v. Maine. That case made
legal history by extending federal sovereign immunity to a state in
its own courts, thus blocking state enforcement of an act of Congress, as well as flouting the Supremacy Clause, contradicting state
statutory waivers of immunity, and earning “the condemnation and
127
resistance of scholars.” The Court did this for the purpose of saving the states from having to conform to federal labor law, thus
stripping state government workers of those protections—such as
the minimum wage, maximum hours, and safe and healthful working conditions. In order to accomplish this, the Alden Court, in effect, extended its untethered jurisprudence on the Eleventh
Amendment to state courts.
Specifically, Alden licensed a state to withhold its own workers’
pay for work that the state had required them to perform after
hours. This wage theft was a violation of the Fair Labor Standards
128
Act and the Supremacy Clause. How could wage theft be a legitimate state interest? How could a state’s disregard of an act of
Congress and the Supremacy Clause be lawful? How could it be
sound policy to permit a state to strip its workers of the protections
of federal labor law for the few personal hours their job leaves to
them to enjoy? The employer may pitilessly demand overtime labor
federal official to enforce the Constitution). Bivens is the federal analog to the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, codified as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 1983. This last term, in Hernandez v. Mesa,
140 S. Ct. 735, 750 (2020), the Supreme Court refused to furnish a Bivens remedy for the
deliberate killing of a Mexican boy cowering behind a pillar on the Mexican side of the border, by a United States border patrol officer shooting from the American side. This, notwithstanding its approval, decades earlier, of a Bivens action for survival (and, by implication, wrongful death), in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). See also Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (holding wrongful death cognizable in admiralty, perhaps the first non-statutory action for wrongful death in American legal history). Instead,
the Hernandez Court held that the Mexican family could not have access to Bivens because
“special factors counsel[ed] hesitation.” Cf. Bivens, 402 U.S. at 396 (Brennan, J.) (noting in
passing that Bivens presented no “special factors counseling hesitation”). This casual remark
has mushroomed into an all-purpose defense that invariably defeats a Bivens action when it
gets to the Supreme Court. Chief among the irrational arguments brought to bear on Hernandez v. Mesa was the argument that to allow the Mexican family to sue could cause friction
in our foreign relations, and thus the case had to be confided to the executive branch. This,
although Mexico had filed a brief urging that the family be allowed to sue in the United
States. Brief of the Government of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae in Support
of the Petitioners, 140 S. Ct. 735 (No. 17-1678), 2019 WL 3776030. As for confiding such a
case to the executive branch, consider that there had been a refusal to prosecute officer Mesa and then a refusal to extradite him. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 755 (stating that prosecution
had been declined); id. at 740 (stating that Mexico’s request for extradition had been denied).
126. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
127. Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 953 (2000); see also Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2000); Louise Weinberg, Of
Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113 (2001).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 207.
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for all of a worker’s waking hours and more. But the law provides
that the employer must pay for such a demand. The statutory wage
129
is time-and-a-half for overtime. It was this essential protection,
worked for and earned, that, in Alden, Maine was held free to deny
130
its overworked probation officers. Of course, in light of the Supremacy Clause, state-law immunity could not furnish a defense to
a federal claim in either set of courts. This was federal sovereign
immunity for a state.
In Franchise III, Alden was lighting the path for Justice Thomas.
He could see his way clear, relying on the federalized sovereign
immunity in federal cases in federal courts (tracing back to the
leading case of Hans v. Louisiana), to applying that immunity in
state courts, following the path marked out by Alden v. Maine, even
when that path now led to a state-law case. Ironically, however, Justice Thomas could not rely on Alden, notwithstanding its novel bestowal of federal immunity in a case against a state in its own
courts. He could not rely on Alden because the Alden Court had
specifically saved Nevada v. Hall. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Alden Court, had distinguished trial in the courts of another state
131
from trial in a state’s own courts.
Nor was there anything in the Constitution that answered the
question posed. Justice Thomas could only refer vaguely to “the
Constitution,” without pointing to any particular constitutional
clause, and without referring to Alden as a precedent, to bestow on
state government defendants the new federal sovereign immunity
first seen in Alden. In Franchise III, however, this is not only a federal immunity in state courts, but also, for the first time in American
legal history, a federal immunity in state courts in state-law cases.
And this new immunity is held to be constitutionally required—
132
although not by anything in the text of the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the interesting unavailability of Alden v. Maine
for Justice Thomas’s use in Franchise III, Franchise III is best under133
stood, I think, as flowing from Alden v. Maine. Alden shields states
129. Id.
130. Alden v. State, No. CV-96-751, 1997 WL 34981639 (Me. Super. 1997), aff’d, 527 U.S.
706 (1999) (stating the approximate number of named plaintiffs as 65). The class itself of
course would have been considerably larger.
131. Alden, 527 U.S. at 738–39 (Kennedy, J.) (“Our opinion in Hall did distinguish a
State’s immunity from suit in federal court from its immunity in the courts of other States; it
did not, however, address or consider any differences between a State’s sovereign immunity
in federal court and in its own courts.”). For international understandings of a sovereign’s
immunity vel non in the courts of another sovereign, as well as analogous federal law on the
point, infra Sections III.A.2, III.C.1. For the views of the American Law Institute on the
point, see infra note 151 and accompanying text.
132. For Justice Thomas’s arguments, see infra Section III.A.
133. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (notoriously holding, notwithstanding the Fair Labor Standards Act’s provision of time-and-a-half pay for overtime work, 29 U.S.C. § 207, that a state
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with federal immunity in federal-law cases in their own courts.
Franchise III extends this federal immunity in two ways. First, federal immunity now shields state defendants in another state’s courts.
And second, it now shields all states, apparently, in state-law cases.
(While it is possible that one or more of the state-law torts in Fran135
chise III could have been pleaded as a federal constitutional tort,
none were. Recall that the Franchise Tax Board litigation was a case
brought under the state common-law tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, among other state-law torts.) In one blow in
Franchise III the Court’s narrow conservative majority deftly
achieved two extensions of Alden.
D. Applying Modern Legal Theory to Our Two Cases
The Supreme Court’s neutral forum, its original jurisdiction,
would not be very useful in cases like our two, in which a state is
sued in a sister state by a private party. That is because the policies
and interests of the two states in such cases are unlikely to conflict.
These cases are in a configuration in which allowing the plaintiff a
chance to prove his case will almost always respect the policy concerns and advance the interests of both the concerned states. A
simple interest analysis can demonstrate this.
In Franchise Tax Board, for example, Nevada’s own waiver of immunity with its monetary cap could not rationally be construed to
make any other state liable for the small sum recoverable, nor
shield any other state from greater liability. Both the waiver and
the cap were about Nevada’s own liability. Nevada had no interest
in applying its immunity arrangements to any other state.
On the other hand, California was clearly an “interested” state; it
would want to shield its own officials from damages liability wherever sued, and could do so rationally, under its own tort claims act.
But its purpose in doing so is to open the state to liability. On this
ground, the Nevada courts rationally could choose to apply California’s waiver of immunity to California. This conclusion is underscored by the fact that California’s waiver would serve Nevada’s
own compensatory and deterrent interests, as the place of injury

may not be sued by its own workers in its own courts for violation of an act of Congress).
Time-and-a-half pay, costly as it may be, nevertheless importantly preserves the hard-won
eight-hour day, and with it helps to protect workers, by separating their private hours from
their workday, and compensating them in recognition of the importance of the separation,
if they must yield their private hours to their employer.
134. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
135. See supra text following note 61, suggesting constitutional theories for Hyatt’s
common-law case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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and residence of the plaintiff. As the Supreme Court acknowl136
edged in Franchise II, Nevada, too, was an interested state because
it was the place of both conduct and injury. Since Nevada’s compensatory interests were not in conflict with the compensatory interests underlying California’s waiver of sovereign immunity in tort
cases, Franchise Tax Board was a no-conflict case. With the exception
of the $50,000 cap on waiver with which Nevada burdened its cases
of government tort, the laws of both states were concerned with
the same goal: the intelligent management of injurious torts
commmitted by government personnel.
It is ironic, then, that the useful remedies the Supreme Court
struck down in Franchise III were in a configuration in which both
states’ interests were advanced by the litigation. The Supreme
Court succeeded only in frustrating the actual governmental interests shared not only by these two states but by virtually all states.
With Nevada’s compensatory and deterrent interests in the case,
the Nevada courts clearly had power simply to default to their own
general tort law, as the Supreme Court, in effect, had held in Franchise II. Here, I should explain that it has been understood for almost a century that, when confronted with an apparent conflict of
laws, the interested state always has power to vindicate its own interests in its own courts, notwithstanding the views of other concerned states. Democratic theory supports the primacy of the interested forum’s own law. The citizens of the concerned state have
not voted for other states’ legislators, nor have they chosen, unless
their elected representatives have done so, to be governed by other
states’ statutes and cases. In this perspective, common-law choiceof-law rules that would authorize departures from the law of the interested forum have been wrong in conception. Even enacted
choice rules, when resulting in departures from the interested forum’s own law, are questionable. They may become arbitrary and
irrational in their disregard of the forum state’s own substantive
policies, and thus may raise constitutional concerns of due process.
Nor is there some general policy of interstate harmony and comity that could justify a court in an interested state in withholding its
own law when its own law would otherwise furnish justice in the
particular case. There is little interstate systemic value in excusing
injustice and licensing wrongdoing.
Perhaps the preceding interest analysis of our two cases is an
oversimplification. Sophisticated variations may be discoverable.
137
But I think not.
136. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1492 (2019).
137. For a reminder of the familiar reasons underlying the workarounds that defeat sovereign immunity in virtually every state, see infra Section III.C.1 and Part VI.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, AMERICAN HISTORY, AND STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. On Constitutional Structure
Nevada v. Hall is irreconcilable with our constitutional structure
and with the historical evidence showing a widespread preratification understanding that states retained immunity from private suits, both in their own courts and in other courts.
—Justice Clarence Thomas

138

[I]f a federal court were to hold, by inference from the structure of
our Constitution and nothing else, that California is not free in
this case to enforce its policy of full compensation, that holding
would constitute the real intrusion on the sovereignty of the
states—and the power of the people—in our Union.
—Justice John Paul Stevens

139

In the Supreme Court’s current view, as elaborated by Justice
Thomas in Franchise III, state sovereign immunity is embedded in
140
the “structure” of the Constitution. This “structure” argument is
essential to the Court’s holding, given the complete absence of
corroborative constitutional text. The “structure” to which the
141
Court refers, of course, is federalism. But our federalism does
not make us a confederacy, intent on states’ rights. We are a Union. We are also a Nation. And our governing charter is not the Articles of Confederation but the Constitution of the United States.
Certainly the Constitution assumes the existence of states, putting
them under constraints and duties, and providing for their representation in Congress. It is from this existence of the states, an essential structural feature of the nation, that the Court leaps to the
conclusion that state sovereign immunity is constitutionally required. But it is hard to see how the conclusion follows from the
premise.

138. Franchise III, 139 U.S. at 1498.
139. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 446–47 (1979).
140. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding Congress without Article
I power to abrogate state immunity).
141. For interesting perspectives on federalism as grounding state sovereign immunity,
see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The International Origins of American Federalism,
120 COLUM. L. REV. 835 (2020). Bellia and Clark also comment on an earlier contribution
by Ernest Young. Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1601, 1625 (2000).
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It is simply not true that the Constitution structures this country
142
as a collection of “sovereign” states. The further argument that
the “sovereign” states require immunity from liability for actual
wrongdoing has no foundation at all.
The shared values and experiences of government at all levels in
the United States is that the cities, counties, states, and the nation
as well—evidently all, as a matter of course, hold themselves re143
sponsible for the injurious misconduct of their officials.
1. Justice Thomas’s Cleverest Argument
Justice Thomas’s cleverest structural argument in Franchise III is
that the Constitution strips the states of various powers of interstate
diplomacy. From this questionable observation, Justice Thomas
leaps to a non-sequitur, the conclusion that this diplomacy-stripping
implicitly also strips the states of their power to deny each other’s
immunity. In Thomas’s words:
Article I divests the States of the traditional diplomatic and
military tools that foreign sovereigns possess. . . . A State’s
assertion of compulsory judicial process over another State
involves a direct conflict between sovereigns. The Constitution implicitly strips States of any power they once had to
refuse each other sovereign immunity, just as it denies
them the power to resolve border disputes by political
means. Interstate immunity, in other words, is “implied as
144
an essential component of federalism.”
Justice Thomas’s point that the Constitution strips the states of
military power and international diplomacy has little relevance and
is not even true. How about the National Guard, and the state
troopers? How about the informal ambassadors the states send
abroad to flog up some business? Texas, for example, has been

142. See infra Section III.B.
143. See infra note 246 on the death of Sandra Bland; and infra Part VI on state provisions for management of torts occasioned by their employees and officers in the course of
their employment.
144. Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1498 (2019) (citing Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Nevada v. Hall). See the fine analysis in Baude, supra note 27, explaining that sovereign immunity was a background postulate of the common law, not of the Constitution; interestingly comparing the states’ power to deny immunity to sister states with the now more limited
power of Congress to abrogate state immunity; and concluding that Nevada v. Hall was rightly decided.
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boosting itself abroad as a good sunny place in which to make mov145
ies. Nothing in the Constitution strips Texas of power to do this.
Justice Thomas’s conclusion that the Constitution strips the
states of power to engage in interstate diplomacy has no objective
correlative in actual experience. Interstate diplomacy is very active
and successful. Cooperation among the Attorneys General is a fa146
miliar and impressive example, and the National Governors As147
sociation meets twice a year. The states have explicit constitutional power to reach interstate compacts, with the approval of
Congress. 148
But even if this were not the reality and the states really had
been stripped of their powers of interstate diplomacy, it hardly follows that they must be immune when on trial in courts other than
their own. Rather, the Constitution creates a particular jurisdiction, the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, to adjudicate actual
interstate controversies in a neutral forum. Where a suit against a
state is at the instance of a private party in another state, the Constitution provides for federal adjudication of such a case in federal
courts, a provision which would be honored and convenient, were
it not for the Eleventh Amendment. As for private cases against a
state in the courts of a sister state, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concern is that the state be liable, not that it be immune. The Fourteenth Amendment is unconcerned with venue. Instead, the Fourteenth Amendment places an obligation on every state to adjudicate private suits against a state. The Fourteenth Amendment says,
explicitly, that no state shall deprive any person of federal constitutional rights.
2. On the Source of Law
Justice Thomas’s reasoning in Franchise III—that the Constitution strips a state court of the power to deny the immunity of a sister state—is not only demonstrably wrong; it also flies in the face of
every rule of law on the subject of choice of law on sovereign immunity. Contrary to Justice Thomas’s views, it is the universal rule

145. See the history of the Texas Film Commission at History: Texas Film Commission, OFF.
OF THE TEX. GOVERNOR, https://gov.texas.gov/film/page/history (last visited Nov. 26,
2020) [https://perma.cc/53ZM-LQJK].
146. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, State Attorneys General as Agents of that,
Police Reform, 69 DUKE L.J. 999 (2020).
147. See NGA Meetings, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/about/meetings
[https://perma.cc/9D35-RHRR].
148. “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.

34

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:1

that a sovereign defendant cannot be heard to declare itself immune from the consequences of its own wrongdoing when it
stands before the tribunal of another sovereign.
Nations are true sovereigns, and, like the states, they can enjoy
sovereign immunity in their own courts. But even a nation cannot
determine its own immunity in the courts of another nation. That is
the universal rule. The question of immunity vel non of a sovereign
in another sovereign’s court is one that only forum law can answer.
Only in the absence of legislation at the forum, or absence of settled case law, will there be room to consider whether to grant immunity as a matter of comity.
For example, in American courts—federal or state—in a suit, let
us say, against France, it is not for French law or for France to determine whether or not France is immune. American courts themselves, federal and state, have no power to consult French law on
the question. In our courts, the national rules governing foreign
immunities are codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
149
150
of 1976 (FSIA). In the Amerada Hess case, the Supreme Court
held that the FSIA is the exclusive determinant of foreign sovereign
immunity in all courts in this country, state or federal. For this reason, our courts have little power to exercise comity or to consent to
the immunity of a foreign nation. They simply must do whatever
the FSIA says to do on the given facts.
The American Law Institute’s just-approved Restatement (Fourth)
of the Foreign Relations of the United States could say little that is meaningful to add to this. As its reporters remark: “The project takes the
general approach of Restatement Third. . . . Restatement Fourth also
includes four new Sections, based on amendments to the Foreign
151
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). . . .” The Institute’s Restatement

149. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611.
150. Republic of Argentina v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431 (1989)
(holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 is the exclusive referent on the
question of foreign immunity vel non in either set of courts). The position is now under challenge in the Supreme Court. See Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172 (D.C. Cir.
2018), cert. granted, No. 18-1447, 2020 WL 3578679 (2020).
151. See Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law: Sovereign Immunity, THE ALI ADVISOR,
http://www.thealiadviser.org/us-foreign-relations-law (last visited Aug. 31, 2020), referring
to recent amendments of the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, excepting from
immunity, inter alia, state supporters of terrorism. This section provides:
§ 1605A. Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state. (a)
In general. (1) No immunity. A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise
covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support
or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or re-
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(Third) on Conflict of Laws, now in its “Tentative Draft No. 6,” is silent on the issue of sovereign immunity.
The Nevada Court in the Franchise Tax Board litigation simply assumed the same position, in this interstate case, that has always obtained in international cases. This is the position that Congress and
the ALI have taken and the civilized nations of the world have always taken, in transnational cases.
Although, in effect, Nevada accepted that, under California’s
tort claims act, California’s tax officials were immunized and that
the state waived its own immunity, an equally plausible reading is
that Nevada’s law, like that of every other state, simply provided no
immunity for sister states. Nevada had all the power it needed to
choose to hold California liable whether California was immune
under its own law or not. The effect, however, would have been
precisely the same as it would have been under the California Tort
Claims Act—that is, California would have shielded its employees and
the agency from liability, but waived its own immunity.
3. The Constitution’s Actual Structure
The actual structure of our Constitution refutes the Court’s
structural argument. In three majestic Articles, the Constitution
sets out the national powers of Congress, of the President, and of
the federal courts. The fourth Article is about the states, but it does
not empower them. Rather, Article IV imposes duties upon them,
152
in addition to the duties mentioned in Article I. The fifth Article
makes it extremely difficult to amend any of this. And the sixth Ar-

sources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.
28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, as a practical matter, manages to immunize state supporters of terrorism at will. See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1386,
1403 (2018) (holding corporations immune from actions under the Alien Tort Statute, and
thus holding immune Jordan’s national bank, in a case brought by victims of Palestinian
terror). The bank is basically a state instrument and a known supporter of terrorism. See
Stephanie Clifford, Arab Bank Liable for Supporting Terrorist Efforts, Jury Finds, NY TIMES (Sept.
22,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/nyregion/arab-bank-found-guilty-ofsupporting-terrorist.html. But it is also a major part of Jordan’s economy and thus important
to stability in the volatile Middle East. Apparently for this reason Israel did not file a brief in
the case. Moreover, the current Court does not approve adjudication of international tort
cases that cannot plead injuries within the United States. See, e.g., RJR-Nabisco v. European
Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108,
124 (2013).
152. For example, the Constitution imposes upon the states the duty of running national
elections. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. Article IV imposes duties of full faith and credit to judgments, of rendition, and of maintaining a republican form of government. Article VI imposes on every state official and judicial officer an oath of fealty to the Constitution. Article VI,
paragraph 1, subordinates the states’ own constitutions, as well as their laws, to federal law.

36

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:1

ticle contains a ringing statement of the supremacy of federal law,
“anything” in the state constitutions and laws to the contrary not153
withstanding. Not content with this assertion of national supremacy, the Framers introduced a separate paragraph in the sixth Article, forcing every state officer and judge to swear to support the
154
Constitution.
The Tenth Amendment is indeed a grant of power to the states,
but it is a grant of undefined residual power only. Indeed, the
Tenth Amendment repeats the residual quality of state power pre155
viously acknowledged even in the Articles of Confederation. Under the Tenth Amendment, only those powers not delegated to the
nation by the Constitution are left for the states. The extent of
these crumbs, this residuum, is somewhat dependent on Congress,
since Congress has the power to do anything that is “necessary and
156
proper.”
With the Supremacy Clause, these latter provisions, tempered by
equality of state representation in the Senate, comprise the structure of federalism actually embedded in the Constitution. We cannot derive from this structure a license to injure persons with impunity in the courts at the state where the tort occurs.
Nor can state sovereign immunity be found in any part of the
Constitution’s text. The Eleventh Amendment, presumably the fons
et origo of state sovereign immunity, is literally, as we have seen, only a rule of construction for a federal court’s diversity jurisdic157
tion. The text of the Eleventh Amendment has no relation to the
153. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.”).
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,
and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both
of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution; . . . .”).
155. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II. The delegation clause of the Articles
of Confederation differs from the Tenth Amendment’s delegation clause in two respects.
First, under the Articles, a delegation of power to the nation had to be express. And second,
a delegation of power to the nation was to be made by Congress, not by the Articles of Confederation itself. Under the Tenth Amendment, it is the Constitution, not Congress, that
delegates power to the nation, and there is no requirement of explicitness.
156. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) (expansively describing the implied powers of Congress granted by the Constitution’s Necessary
and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.”).
157. In its entirety, the Eleventh Amendment reads: “The judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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classes of cases upon which the Court has been bringing it to bear
for well over a century, a fact with which the Court seems increasingly comfortable, substituting for the Eleventh Amendment, when
needed, an all-encompassing background principle.
I would venture to suggest that the Eleventh Amendment itself is
unconstitutional, notwithstanding the apparent contradiction in
terms. In support of this conclusion, I note that the Amendment
discriminates against nonresidents in the matter of access to federal courts. That discrimination is at least problematic, and on that
ground the Eleventh Amendment should have been declared obsolete and untenable long ago. That could have been done silently
with simple disregard.
Justice Bradley, in doing away with one “anomaly” in Hans created two others. First, he extended the Eleventh Amendment from
the diversity jurisdiction to the federal-question jurisdiction of federal courts, but failed to extend it to the original jurisdiction or the
admiralty jurisdiction, thus creating gaps which had to be filled
158
years later.
Second, and worse, Justice Bradley in Hans left the Eleventh
Amendment applicable in federal but not in state courts. We know
now that such an arrangement is unconstitutional. One of our
159
greatest cases, Erie v. Tompkins, requires the identification of the
sovereign whose law is applicable, 160 and whichever law, state or
federal, is held applicable on any point must then be applied, no
matter whether the question arises in a state court or a federal
court. Governing law must apply in both sets of courts or it is likely
to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, from this perspective,
has resolved the latter problem presented by Hans with Alden v.
Maine and Franchise III. That would be a commendable improvement but for the fact that what has been extended is universal federalized immunity. Although the extension of immunity to state
courts puts paid to Justice Bradley’s anomalously narrow extension
of the Eleventh Amendment, it does away with court access to justice for serious violations by a state of acts of Congress and even
the Constitution.
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment, in its first Section,
makes very clear that the states shall be liable, should they deprive

158. See, e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (admiralty).
159. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
160. Id. at 79 (Brandeis, J.) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (“But law
in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority
behind it.”); see Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking
Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057 (2013); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U.
L. REV. 805 (1989).
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any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, evidently would impose
liability on the states, not immunity.
It would appear that the “structure of the Constitution” simply
will not bear the weight of unreason the Supreme Court is heaping
upon it.
B. On State Sovereignty
Disambiguation might be helpful in examining the concept of
state sovereign immunity. So, let us turn, first, to the question of
state sovereignty, while we postpone the further question of state
immunity.
To what extent, since the structure of the Constitution is unavailing, can the states nevertheless be found to be “sovereign” on
161
some more persuasive basis? In Alden v. Maine, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, stated unqualifiedly that the sovereignty of
the states both preceded and survived the Constitution. 162 He referred vaguely to “structure” and “history” and “authoritative inter163
164
pretations” by the Court. In Blatchford v. Native Village, Justice
Scalia stated unequivocally: “The States entered the federal system
with their sovereignty intact.” But he also cited no authority for
this. Similar declarations ex cathedra are conspicuous among the
165
sources of modern “authority” for a re-imagined history. In this
sort of pronouncement we see the modern Court painting a picture of sovereignty as an ancient and permanent attribute of every
state. Is there any support for state sovereignty in our history?

161. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
162. Id. at 713. For the relation of this position to an opinion by Justice Brennan, see
Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1113, 1128–29 (2001).
163. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
164. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
165. The modern rewritten history of state sovereignty is laid out in Fed. Mar. Comm’n v.
South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (Thomas, J.), which held that a state has
sovereign immunity from suit by the Federal Maritime Commission; Alden, 527 U.S. 706,
which held that a state has sovereign immunity from suit for violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), which held that Congress has no
Article I power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment; that is, to require a state to comply
with acts of Congress. (!)
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1. Colonial Times
The colonies were hardly sovereign. The only “sovereign” the
166
American colonists knew was the King, the “Crown.” Even in the
early years of the Revolution, the King was still appointing the co167
lonial governors and paying the salaries of the colonial judges. It
is true that the colonies enjoyed a measure of self-governance, in
part attributable to benign neglect by the Crown with respect to
the colonies’ internal affairs. Some colonies had their own legislatures and their own courts. But the highest colonial courts, with
the important jurisdiction over taxation and ships, remained the
colonial courts of the Crown, and these had to yield final judicial
168
review to the Privy Council in London. The colonies’ most relia169
ble currency was the British pound. There could be no sovereignty for a former colony in these sorts of arrangements.
2. Union and Revolution
Although there probably never was full-bore popular enthusiasm
for revolution, George Washington would come to use a colony’s
local militia adroitly to report and acquire news, tend the crops,
170
befriend defecting British soldiers, and do a little spying. Despite
the want of enthusiasm in the countryside, and notwithstanding
the growing differences between North and South, there was a real
and increasing union of feeling and purpose in the colonies, even
as they became increasingly self-governing. We see their approach-

166. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 58 (2002).
167. See THE GOVERNORS OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES PRIOR TO 1750: AND OFFICERS OF
THE HEREDITARY ORDER OF DESCENDANTS OF COLONIAL GOVERNORS (Franklin Classics 2018)
(1890–1899).
168. See 1 ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND (John Roche Dasent ed., Nabu Press
2011) (1894); CARL UBBELOHDE, THE AMERICAN COLONIES AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 16071763 (John Hope Franklin & Abraham S. Eisenstadt eds., 1968); JOHN PALMER & BARON
JOHN SINGLETON COPLEY LYNDHURST, THE PRACTICE ON APPEALS FROM THE COLONIES TO
THE PRIVY COUNCIL: WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF THE JURISDICTION OF THAT HIGH COURT (BiblioLife 2015) (1831); JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE
AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1965).
169. See generally JOHN WRIGHT, THE AMERICAN NEGOTIATOR: OR, THE VARIOUS
CURRENCIES OF THE BRITISH COLONIES IN AMERICA; AS WELL THE ISLANDS, AS THE CONTINENT
(Palala Press 2016) (1765) (describing the various currencies in common use in the first half
of the eighteenth century in North America, and emphasizing throughout this extensive
survey that the only currency acceptable everywhere was the British pound).
170. For recent colorful accounts, see STEPHEN R. TAAFFE, WASHINGTON’S
REVOLUTIONARY WAR GENERALS (2019); and THOMAS B. ALLEN, GEORGE WASHINGTON,
SPYMASTER: HOW THE AMERICANS OUTSPIED THE BRITISH AND WON THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
(2007).
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ing Union in records of the Committees of Correspondence and
the widespread development of such common endeavors as the
172
forming of Committees of Safety; the storing of supplies; the digging of earthworks; the self-arming of the people; and the recruitment, training, and uniforming of regiments from each colony as it
sought independence.
Above all, in Philadelphia the Continental Congress began sitting in the autumn of 1774, with delegates from twelve of the British colonies; this, our earliest Congress, reconvened the following
spring with delegates from all thirteen colonies, to direct the conduct of the Revolution. And the colonies submitted to the sense of
173
the Congress on the conduct of the War, throughout.
The crucial point is that there were no “states,” whatever the
unifying spirit reigning in the great rebellion, and however effectual the instruments of self-government in the colonies. The Union
was coming into being long before the birth of the states and long
174
before the birth of the Nation. Abraham Lincoln said, “[t]he Un175
ion is older than the Constitution.” He could have said as well
that the Union is older than the states. There was no state sovereignty, intact or otherwise, because there were no states before
1776. There were only thirteen former colonies, each retaining the
name of colony, plantation, or province.
3. The Birth of the States
We know when the states came into existence and came together as a nation, both events occurring at the same time. We celebrate this birthday every July 4. On that date, in 1776, a most consequential step for world history was taken. The Declaration of
Independence was read aloud to the troops gathered in every city
and town in the thirteen colonies and posted wherever the colonists gathered in every city and town. On that date, July 4, 1776,
the colonies ceased to exist as appendages of the Crown. The
United States of America was born, free and independent, and was
given its name, and the states were given their names as “states”
171. See generally EDWARD DAY COLLINS, COMMITTEES OF CORRESPONDENCE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1902).
172. See generally AGNES HUNT, THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES OF SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (Wentworth Press 2019) (1904).
173. See, for a fine modern account, JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL
POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1976).
174. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95–168
(1992).
175. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), https://avalon.law.
yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp [https://perma.cc/7VQT-8YNJ].
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and were born that day as “states in Union,” a coinage appearing
177
in passing in the 1869 case of Texas v. White.
Thus, there could have been no state sovereignty with which the
states entered the Union in 1776, because there were no states.
There was no law, before that date, endowing the British colonies
with sovereignty, or with statehood. The first such usage in a constitutional sense occurs only with the Articles of Confederation of
1781.
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court in Franchise III, also locates
the birth of the states in the Declaration of Independence of 1776.
But he characterizes the states therein as each fully sovereign and
independent. He quotes the final paragraph of the Declaration as
securing this sovereignty. According to Thomas, the Founders
there declared all the states to be “Free and Independent states”
with “full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances,
establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which
178
Independent states may of right do.” Consulting international
law, Justice Thomas concludes that independence from the Crown
“entitled” the Colonies “to all the rights and powers of sovereign
179
states.” This is adroit, but it will not do. It has no referent in the
body of the Declaration of Independence, which is in the form of a
letter to the King. The language to which Justice Thomas refers
appears in the closing salutation of that letter, the equivalent of
“Sincerely yours,” always followed by a signature. But even in the
salutation, the independence declared on July 4 was, explicitly, the
independence of the “union of states,” not of each state. The salutation was offered by “the representatives” of the United States, by
the authority of all its People, and in Congress duly assembled, not
by the authority of the people of each state assembled in its individual state house:
We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of
America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the
Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That
these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free
180
and Independent States. . . .

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726 (1869).
Id.
Franchise III, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1493 (2019).
Id. (citing McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209 (1808)).
The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
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That salutation has been understood for 225 years, until Justice
Thomas’s selective reading of it, as introducing the signatories to
the letter, even referring to themselves as “these Colonies.” We
know that the Declaration of Independence is the birth certificate
of our independence as a nation from the mother country. We did
not declare the independence of New Jersey.
Even Justice Kennedy, in his own ahistorical and regrettable
opinions on sovereign immunity, Seminole Tribe and Alden v. Maine,
did not cite the closing salutation of the Declaration of Independence in support of his views.
181
The obscure McIlvaine case on which Justice Thomas also relies for his unique reading of the Declaration’s salutation does not,
in fact, support that reading. Several of the states had sought permission from the Continental Congress during the revolution to
declare themselves independent, and Congress gave its approval or
not to each such supplicant state, depending on the then progress
of the war. New Jersey was among those which were permitted to
182
declare their independence. McIlvaine had nothing to say about
the Declaration of Independence, because it really was about the
independence of New Jersey. The case was not in the Supreme
Court’s important appellate jurisdiction, but only in its original jurisdiction for cases against a state. It was not about sovereignty. Rather, it was about a grant of land located in New Jersey. In the
course of the opinion, casual reference is made, in dating an event,
to the date of New Jersey’s declaration of its own independence, by
183
permission of the Continental Congress during the War.
But McIlvaine does lend some support to to Justice Thomas’s argument. New Jersey’s petition to Congress for permission to declare its own independence does mention sovereignty, and the
terms of New Jersey’s request were simply repeated in Congress’s
184
grant of such permission. Justice Thomas goes very far in allowing us to suppose this permission in the words of this particular
approval, with its rote mention of sovereignty repeating the word
used by New Jersey, somehow applied to all the colonies.

181. McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. 209 (1808) (cited in Franchise III, 139 U.S. at
1493).
182. See Saving America’s Treasures: The Revolution in New Jersey, N.J. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://nj.gov/state/archives/eventsat.html [https://perma.cc/E9C5-46YE] (last visited
Nov. 26, 2020).
183. McIlvaine, 8 U.S. at 212.
184. See Saving America’s Treasures, supra note 182.
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4. The Real Birth of State Sovereignty
The Articles of Confederation of 1781 was the first and only
formal document that explicitly endowed the states with sovereignty. Article II of the Articles of Confederation provided:
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not
by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United
185
States, in Congress assembled.
Moreover, by use of the word “retains,” the reader is led to believe that the sovereignty here declared preceded the Articles of
Confederation. This declaration of state sovereignty preceded the
ratified Constitution of 1789 by eight years. Adding the five years
between Independence and the Articles of Confederation to the
eight years of the Articles of Confederation, we have thirteen years
in all. This seems a rather slender reed on which to support the
current weight of federal case law relying on “early understandings” of “state sovereignty.” But it is the eight years under the Articles that comprise the only years of constitutionally recognized
state sovereignty in American history. That is, unless state sovereignty survived the Constitution.
5. The Rollup of Conventions
The origins of the Constitution lie in a rollup of little “conventions” that led to the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The curtain opens on an interesting story. General George Washington, in
retirement at his home at Mount Vernon, Virginia, is worrying
186
about the increasing fractiousness among the states. In 1785,
Washington was concerned enough about a serious interstate water

185. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II. Notably, there is no mention in the
Articles of Confederation of “immunity” from judicial process or anything else.
186. Back in 1754, Benjamin Franklin had invited delegates from the colonial assemblies
to a convention at Albany to unify the colonists’ confrontation with the Indians and had
there first proposed a continental Congress. When Franklin’s proposal came to nothing, he
left for Great Britain where he served as an informal ambassador to the Crown for various
American colonies. Twenty-five years later he returned in disgust with the Crown to back the
Patriot cause. Franklin is sometimes credited with having brought the French and the
French fleet to our shores, a decisive factor in the War. E.g., RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE
FORGING OF THE UNION: 1781-1789, 208–17 (1987); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 186–87 (enlarged ed. 1992). The following account
of the rollup of conventions that led to the Constitutional Convention is drawn mainly from
MORRIS, supra.
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dispute to call a meeting at Mount Vernon, his house. Washington sent invitations to distinguished delegates to represent each of
the three states concerned. Of those, two, representing Virginia
and Maryland, rushed to his side.
Under the Articles of Confederation, an issue such as a dispute
over water rights could be brought in a state court. But it was selfevident that neither state could be content with litigation in the
188
other’s courts. The Articles did provide for final independent determination of such a dispute, but only by Congress. 189 The Articles
of Confederation made no arrangement for national courts.
At this “Mount Vernon Convention,” George Washington
backed James Madison’s idea of a convention of delegates from all
the states, to consider the inability of the nation under the Articles
of Confederation to deal with interstate friction. Washington, more
than ever the Father of our country, called for such a convention
to be held at Annapolis the following year.
The “Annapolis Convention” was attended at the Colonial Court
190
of Vice-Admiralty by invitees from five states. Anti-Federalists at
the time feared a stronger central government as threatening a renewal of their experiences under the Crown. But at Annapolis, it
was noted and conceded that the states were interfering with each
other’s commerce, imposing their own tariffs, and authorizing
their own currencies. Farmers in Western Massachusetts were even
191
thought to be in rebellion. It was understood more clearly than it
had been that, under the Articles of Confederation, the Nation
had inadequate means of restoring order to the Union.
At Washington’s request, Alexander Hamilton prepared a report
of the situation to be sent to Congress above Washington’s signature. Washington’s letter requested Congress to authorize a convention of all thirteen states to be held in Philadelphia the following summer. The convention was to be assembled for the purpose
of amending the Articles of Confederation in order to impose

187. On the Mount Vernon Convention, see MORRIS, supra note 186, at 249–52.
188. The Constitution provides the independent arbiter for interstate boundary and water disputes that was lacking in the Articles of Confederation. Such disputes are handled by
the Supreme Court, in the original jurisdiction granted the Court in Article III. In suits
against a state as defendant of record at the instance of a private party, the state is also afforded the dignity and impartiality of Supreme Court jurisdiction, but these sorts of cases
are discretionary with the Court and are typically remanded to a federal district court for
litigation. Both are to be distinguished from suits against a state officer at the instance of a
private party, the typical shape of public-law litigation in courts of general jurisdiction.
189. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 2.
190. The attending delegates were from Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia. Maryland apparently did not choose to attend. See Annapolis Convention,
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com /event/Annapolis-Convention.
191. MORRIS, supra note 186, at 25–57.
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192

greater national order upon the states. All the state dignitaries
attending the Annapolis Convention co-signed the Hamilton report and sent it on to the Confederation Congress, which was then
sitting in New York. After some delay, Congress approved the proposal, with the understanding that the proposed Convention was to
revise the Articles.
Thus, it was that the Constitutional Convention, with George
Washington sitting at its head, was convened in Philadelphia in the
193
hot July of 1787. The ostensible purpose was to improve upon
the existing Articles of Confederation. It is commonly said that, at
the Philadelphia Convention, those attending—some of the finest
political thinkers in the country—put themselves to the task of
writing a new constitution. But that is not quite what happened.
The Constitution in many ways is a child of the Articles of Confederation. Innumerable of the provisions of the Articles are preserved, often intact. But among the more drastic improvements is
the Constitution’s total erasure of the Articles’ prime directive, endowing each state with “sovereignty.”
From what has been said thus far, we can gather that the driving
force behind George Washington’s stewardship, and behind the
Constitutional Convention, remained the perceived need to sub194
ordinate the states to the nation. That the Constitution achieves
this with every reference to national power, every reference to state
duty, and every denial of state power, renders almost embarrassing
the Supreme Court’s efforts to bedizen the states with a sovereignty
the Constitution clearly denies them.
The Constitution creates the separate federal judicial power. It
establishes our one Supreme Court. And it creates the Supremacy
195
Clause, with the attendant duty of every state judge and officer to
196
take an oath subordinating the state to the national will. Under
the Constitution, the states exist within the Union but must shoulder certain responsibilities. They retain power over whatever the
Constitution does not delegate to the nation. But the Constitution
strips away the power they had, under the Articles, when in Con-

192. Id. at 277, 280–81.
193. For George Washington’s roll-up of conventions, see Kate Mason Rowland, The
Mount Vernon Convention, 11 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 369, 410–35 (1888); and Richard
B, Morris, The Mount Vernon Conference: First Step Toward Philadelphia, THIS CONST.: A
BICENTENNIAL CHRON., Spring 1985, at 38–40.
194. MORRIS, supra note 186, at 257.
195. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
196. Id. at cl. 3 (“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members
of the several state Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United
States and of the several states, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution. . . ,” including, of course, the laws enacted thereunder, and the Supremacy
Clause).
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gress assembled, to delegate powers to the nation. Under the Articles, such delegations were not only to be made by the states
through Congress, but must also be “express.” Under the Constitution, however, only the Constitution itself delegates power to the
nation. Moreover, there is no requirement of explicitness. Implied
197
powers, if their exercise is “necessary and proper,” are not proscribed.
As for the sovereignty of the nation, Chief Justice Marshall ex198
plained, in the great case of McCulloch v. Maryland, that the only
sovereign that ordained and established the Constitution was “We,
the People.” It certainly was not Them, the states. It is true, Marshall acknowledged, that, to ratify the Constitution, We, the People, assembled in our several states. But, he continued, “where else
199
should [We] have assembled?”
How could even the limited state sovereignty briefly and divisively imposed on our Union by the defective Articles of Confederation survive a Constitution authored with the express purpose of
defeating it? The Constitution forbids the states to take actions that
true sovereigns can take and do. Although the Articles also withheld some of those powers from the states, it is still worth noting
that the Constitution prohibits states from entering treaties or alliances, coining money, impairing the obligation of contracts, and
200
granting titles of nobility. A state must obtain the approval of
Congress before it can lay a tax on its own interstate or international trade, and it must turn over to Congress the revenue from
201
any such tax. States cannot take military action in times of war
without the consent of Congress, unless there is some emergen202
cy. Obligations that even the Articles imposed on the states are
203
maintained. The states must recognize and enforce each other’s
204
205
judgments. They must not discriminate against nonresidents.
And they must render up prisoners (and slaves) who are wanted in

197. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (providing that Congress shall have power “[t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof”). For Chief Justice Marshall’s description of the
scope of this, the Necessary and Proper Clause, see supra note 156.
198. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
199. Id. at 403; see also WOOD, supra note 166 at 212 (suggesting that Chief Justice Marshall’s identification of “the People” as sovereign may have had its roots in the previous decade, with the colonists’ wrath against the Crown, and in their emerging belief that Parliament, being representative, might be the truer expression of popular will).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
204. Id. § 1.
205. Id. § 2.
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another state on request. What sovereign in the world would suffer such nullification of essential sovereign powers?
Nothing in our federalism or any other feature supposedly embedded in the Constitution’s “structure” repeals the Constitution’s
actual structure.
In short, it is simply not possible to read state sovereignty into
the Constitution. The Constitution overwhelmingly subordinates
the states to the national will, as contemplated in the plan of the
Convention.
6. The Death of State Sovereignty
The question, then, is whether state sovereignty, introduced by
the Articles of Confederation, could have survived its apparent burial by the Constitution. The Supreme Court’s answer today is an
207
emphatic “Yes.” History’s answer is an emphatic “No.” The Constitution remains our fundamental law, and nothing that contradicts it can survive. Nor can ground rules more attributable to the
Articles of Confederation than to the Constitution be validated by
ritual incantation of the word “federalism.” The historically accurate statement is that the states were to be more fully subordinated
to the Nation in the plan of the Convention, and that intention is
embodied in the Constitution of the United States. As We, the
People, stated in our Preamble to the Constitution, at its very head,
We ordained and established the Constitution “in Order to form a
208
more perfect Union.” There is no intention to form more sovereign
states. Nothing in our federalism erases this central purpose of our
fundamental law, this essential nature of our federalism—that it is
a Union, not a confederation. Which brings us to the Civil War.
7. The Civil War
In the recent Court’s discussions of the Founding, the Supreme
Court reveals itself to be in a curious condition of forgetfulness.
What about the Civil War? We had a great Civil War. Nostalgia for
an antebellum period of states’ rights is too casual about the taint
of slavery that darkens our history. It is disregardful of the election
206. Id.
207. This was a question of importance for Justice Kennedy in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 US 44, 83 (1996). There, he insisted that preexisting state sovereignty, which Justice
Brennan had declared trumped by the commerce power in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1988), had both preceded and survived the Constitution.
208. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
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of 1860. It is disrespectful of the sacrifice of those who gave “the
last full measure of devotion” to save the Union and did save it.
209
The result was a new, triply-amended Constitution. This rebirth
of the nation, a second Founding, should have informed the Supreme Court in its thinking about state responsibilities.
In the antebellum period, Southern states had amassed surprising political power in Washington—surprising, given the South’s
much slower growth in immigration, industrial activity, and other
indicia of likely political influence. Throughout the antebellum
period, the South enjoyed seemingly inexplicable control of the
Senate, the Presidency, and the Supreme Court. To Northerners,
210
this was the mysterious “slave power” they could not fathom. But,
whatever the source of the antebellum Southern ascendancy, by
the 1850s it should have become obvious that Southern dependency on slave labor, and consequent debasement of poor whites
(who, being unneeded, were often uneducated and unemployed),
was standing in the way of the kind of mass immigration and industrialization that Northern free states were experiencing. In consequence, and notwithstanding the stratagems that had kept the
South’s grasp on power in Washington, D.C., the South was losing
the political power that, in a democracy, population must pro211
vide. The threat to the South of the loss of national political
power became reality when Abraham Lincoln won the presidency
in 1860, despite his absence from the ballot in ten Southern states.
Southerners saw that they were losing control over national politics
and feared that eventually the anti-slavery faction up North would
destroy the Southern way of life.
The secession of the Southern states, half of our country, was
not to be borne. The Nation fought back. Six hundred thousand
Americans died. The United States of America won. The Confederate States of America lost. Nothing in the existence of our states
or our federalism unwins the Civil War.
But the Supreme Court can unwin it for us. The Supreme Court
for some time has been laboring to subordinate the national will to
the notion of “states’ rights” that the Civil War crushed, undermining the Constitution that the Court was created in large part to enforce, protect, and defend. Why should restoration of John C. Cal-

209. For a fine recent account, see ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL
WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019).
210. For my analysis of the antebellum southern ascendancy, see Louise Weinberg, Dred
Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI-KENT L. REV. 97 (2007) [hereinafter Weinberg, Dred
Scott]. For my explanation of the Southern ascendancy, see Louise Weinberg, Luther v.
Borden: A Taney-Court Mystery Solved, 37 PACE L. REV. 700, 753–63 (2017).
211. Weinberg, Dred Scott, supra note 210, at 111–12.
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houn’s antebellum understandings—restoration, in effect, of the
Articles of Confederation—be a project of our Supreme Court?
No state sovereignty could have or should have survived the nation’s victory in the Civil War. The Fourteenth Amendment is the
most precious fruit of that victory, and the Fourteenth Amendment
says: “No state shall . . . .” No state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, or of the equal
protection of the laws, or of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. The logical implication of this, and it has been so under212
stood since 1871 when Congress codified the understanding, is
that a state shall be liable for violation of the Constitution and laws.
The other mystery now is why impunity for government violations of the Constitution should ever have been assumed to be a
conservative position. When government, state or federal, is the
problem instead of the solution, a true conservatism would surely
ensure responsibility, not impunity.
C. On State Immunity
Having made our attempt to find a basis for state sovereignty in
the Constitution, we can proceed to examine the Court’s position
on state immunity.
1. The Court’s Position and the Real Position
Justice Thomas’s opinion in Franchise III seems written with confidence that the states should be able to violate law with impunity.
He himself may believe that there is a pressing need for this immunity, so pressing that the states must be afforded a constitutionally required defense of federal immunity, even in state-law cases
and even in state-law cases in state courts.
Yet the states are able to act only through their personnel. They
routinely come forward and defend in suits against their personnel. The states settle ordinary tort claims against their workers and
constitutional tort claims against their officials, or they appear, defend, and pay any judgments against them. They budget for these
obligations.
To be sure, in courts of general jurisdiction, a state is almost always immune as a party of record. There is a party-of-record rule of

212. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22 §1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1983)).
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213
ancient lineage, prominent in the early case of Osborn v. Bank, a
rule which precludes suits against a state as defendant of record.
But suit against state officers and agencies has long been permit214
ted. The familiar mechanism, at law as in equity, is that of the
Anglo-American “officer suit.” The action is brought against the responsible official or department, but not formally against the state.
Nevertheless, the state settles or defends it and pays any judgment.
Alternatively, the state simply indemnifies its employee, should she
be held liable.
For this purpose, the states maintain civil litigation departments
and employ trial lawyers. Most states have “little” tort claims acts.
Some have “little” civil rights acts as well. In the absence of such
legislation, a state will indemnify an official who has been held liable, just as a city will, sometimes insuring against the event. If the
state does not come in and defend, the insurer will. We will be ex215
ploring this real-world experience in a later Part.

2. State Immunity and the Constitution
State immunity has no more presence in the Constitution’s text
than state sovereignty does. There are “immunities” in Article IV
and in the Fourteenth Amendment, but those are the (privileges
and) immunities of citizens, not of states.
The sovereign immunity the states can claim today has its origins
wholly in the Supreme Court’s own untethered jurisprudence. The
Court has extended the Eleventh Amendment and its supposed
background postulates beyond all recognition in an unending line
216
of startling cases, and without regard to the Eleventh Amendment’s text.
It is common knowledge that the Eleventh Amendment was a
217
reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia, an ordinary contract case brought
in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over diversity cases
against a state. It was a case seeking to make Georgia pay a debt to

213. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 739, 797 (1824).
214. Cf. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (holding that although a federal agency’s
sovereign immunity had been waived, the needed Bivens action would not lie).
215. See infra Part VI.
216. For recent extensions of the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereignty, see supra
note 30; and infra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. For earlier extensions see LOUISE
WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL
POWER 779–846 (1994).
217. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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218
a foreigner. As the first Justice Harlan would point out, Chisholm
was probably right when decided. Among other things, the Founders wanted our credit, public and private, to appear sound to the
219
world. But after Chisholm, there was a backlash, and the Eleventh
Amendment was the result. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment simply
overrides Chisholm on its facts. It is, read literally, only a rule of
construction for Article III, limiting federal judicial power over a
variety of diversity cases against a state. The Amendment provides
that the judicial power shall not be “construed” to apply in diversity
cases like Chisholm, cases enforcing a common-law commercial contract against a state.
An all-purpose federal immunity defense for the states nevertheless has long been attributed to the Eleventh Amendment. And
now the defense is attributed vaguely to “the Constitution,” more
vaguely to federalism, and even more vaguely to the “Constitution’s
structure,” which is federalism plus a mysterious stripping of powers of diplomacy and negotiation.
A potent support for state immunity has also been found in the
supposition of vague background “postulates.” These are the mysterious background understandings that the Lochner-era Court in
its last discreditable years could discern back in 1934—background
220
“postulates that limit and control.” We now have arrived at the
background “postulate” of an all-encompassing inviolable federalized state immunity in state courts, whether the states want it or
221
not.
Think about this. Here, in 2020, is a textualist Supreme Court
222
insisting that a little postulate that is not there is one of the most
vital parts of the constitutional order. Yet nothing in American history or Anglo-American tradition commends lawless governance
unchecked by courts when a private person is injured thereby and
complains.
Reading blanket state sovereign immunity into a Constitution
that is silent on the subject and, with its Fourteenth Amendment

218. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I am of opinion
that the decision in [Chisholm] was based upon a sound interpretation of the constitution as
that instrument then was.”).
219. See George Washington, Circular to the States (June 14, 1783), in FRIENDS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: THE WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS 1787–1788, 12–22 (Colleen A.
Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998).
220. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
221. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 719 (1999) (taking the position that it is a background understanding of the Constitution that, notwithstanding the Supremacy Clause,
federal law cannot be enforced against a state in its own courts without its consent).
222. Hughes Mearns, Antigonish, reprinted in BEST REMEMBERED POEMS 107 (Martin
Gardner ed., 1992) (“Yesterday upon the stair/ I met a man who wasn’t there. / He wasn’t
there again today. / I wish, I wish he’d go away.”).
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reads the other way, has been the Supreme Court’s project for far
too long. The Supreme Court has shielded the states from the national ideals of independent accessible courts and fair government,
as though a state is too autonomous and dignified, or perhaps too
223
broke, to respond to tort claims. It is an all-encompassing jurisprudential régime of lawlessness, now fully applicable in both sets
of courts, in both federal and state cases.
3. State Immunity and Federal Common Law
This paper has been arguing federalized state sovereign immunity is not to be found in the Constitution, or in the federalism embedded in the Constitution’s “structure,” as Justice Thomas attempted to argue in Franchise III. Rather, it is to be found only in
Supreme Court opinions—over a century of them—including
Franchise III. State sovereign immunity is simply a creature of federal common law.
There is a certain irony in this. Federal common law has been
the Court’s particular whipping-boy. Yet federal common law is
simply the decision of federal cases, and the decision of federal
cases is the business the Supreme Court is in. Moreover, the Constitution, Article III, extends the federal judicial power to every
federal case and every federal question. Nevertheless, the Court
opines that making a federal cause of action cognizable, and even
utilization of existing federal causes of action, somehow lie beyond
its ordinary adjudicatory powers. In the Court’s view, only Congress
can provide causes of action, even a cause of action for violation of
224
225
the Constitution or of Congress’s own enactments. The latter
disrespect for acts of Congress is what the Supreme Court terms
“deference to Congress” and to the “separation of powers.”

223.
We will turn to the question of the impact of state tort liability on state budgets infra Part V.
224. See supra note 125 on the refusal of the Supreme Court in such cases as Hernandez
v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020), to approve a Bivens claim. See also, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 545
U.S. 537 (2007) (Souter, J.) (holding that an action would not lie against federal agents for
a decade of harassment destroying the plaintiff’s business). In Wilkie, Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, characterized the agency’s decade of outrageous attacks on Robbins’ ranch as
“death by a thousand cuts.” Id. at 555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, however,
writing for the Court, characterized it as “hard bargaining.” Id. at 554. Perhaps Justice Souter, if on the Court today, would characterize the Tax Board’s outrageous misconduct in
Franchise III as “zealous auditing.”
225. See RJR-Nabisco v. European Union, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) (Alito, J.) (holding that
Congress failed to make plain the extraterritorial reach of federal anti-terror jurisdiction in
part of an act of Congress that the Court itself read as instinct with extraterritorial intention).

FALL 2020] Sovereign Immunity and Interstate Government Tort

53

On the other hand, the Court freely creates and insists upon
federal common-law defenses, such as state sovereign immunity. In
cases such as Alden v. Maine, we find the Court’s textualist majority
insisting that “federalism” somehow implies an atextual permission
to the states to violate the Constitution and laws and to ignore the
Supremacy Clause and the oath of office. In Franchise III, we find a
federal common-law rule that a state be allowed to come into another state to violate the tort law of both states, even if suit is
brought at the place of injury, where the plaintiff resides.
226
Original sin in this area lies in Hans v. Louisiana, the case that
first extended the Eleventh Amendment seriously beyond its express terms. We have seen that, to avoid one “anomaly,” the Hans
227
Court created another. After Hans, immunity rules would apply
in federal courts different from those applied in state courts. Alden
and Franchise III share one virtue: they put paid to that further
anomaly. The bad news is that in sustaining the states’ immunity
from suit in both judicial systems, Alden and Franchise III trash the
ability of either judicial system to enforce law, any law, state or federal, enacted or customary, against any state. It is a régime of uncontrolled state government lawlessness.
Sometimes state immunity is framed as a rule that suit against a
state can be maintained only if the state consents. Yet we sense, if
only from the licensed wage theft in Alden v. Maine, that there is an
unreality in conditioning suits against a state on the state’s consent.
How can a state decide for itself whether it is free to violate an act
of Congress? Or the Constitution? Nevertheless this “consent” formula persists, notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment, which
in terms emphatically does not condition on state consent the du228
ties it magisterially imposes upon them.
This concocted “consent” requirement does not earn points for
any benefit it bestows. There should be no free pass for a state officer or worker to oppress any segment of its population or any
person within or beyond the state. After all, We, the People, ordained and established the Constitution “in Order,” we said, “to
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our

226. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
227. See supra notes 29, 158 and accompanying text.
228. This “consent” fiction is traced most familiarly to Alexander Hamilton’s argument
in The Federalist No. 81, attempting to defend the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton was referring, as he had made
clear in The Federalist No. 32, to ordinary contract cases—that is, to cases that would typically
be governed by state law today. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton).
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Posterity.” We did not ordain and establish the Constitution to
give the states permission to violate it.
The saving message for us in all this is that the Court’s long battle for state official impunity is just federal common law. It can be
overruled.
IV. ON THE PLACE OF TRIAL
It is singular, and worthy of note, that the Supreme Court, in
Franchise III, held unconstitutional a taking of jurisdiction to adjudicate a tort occurring at the place of trial. Ironically, the Court
has recently been holding in international cases that courts in this
country may not adjudicate a common-law tort attributable to for230
eign government officials in the absence of injury here. In another
recent international case, involving an action authorized by an act
of Congress without territorial limit, the Supreme Court held that
231
to justify trial here, the United States must be the place of injury.
Clearly, all else equal, the place of injury is the one place that sure232
ly does have power to exercise “a jurisdiction given.” Or so one
would have thought, until Franchise III.
To the Franchise III Court, it made a difference that the defendant was a state. And indeed, the defendant state, California, was arguing, in effect, that it was immune in Nevada. But California
would not have been immune at home. California had waived its
immunity under its tort claims act. Notwithstanding the overwhelming support of the states in Franchise III for jettisoning Franchise I and overruling Nevada v. Hall, the jurisdiction the states
threw away in Franchise III could hardly matter to them, if immunity
is the issue. It is hard to see why a state needs to be more immune
in interstate cases than it is in intrastate cases.
It also should have weighed more strongly with the Supreme
Court in Franchise III that courts at the place of injury have adjudicatory and lawmaking power over that injury as a matter of course.
The place of injury has legitimate governmental interests in compensation and deterrence. In addition, the place of injury is often
the place where the plaintiff resides. In both Franchise III and in
Nevada v. Hall, the plaintiffs were in their home states when officials from another state intruded themselves into the plaintiffs’
229. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
230. See, e.g., Personenverkehr v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 396 (2015).
231. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
232. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (“We
have no more right to decline the exercise of a jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp
that which is not given.”).
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home state and caused injury there. Government tort policies are
not extinguished by the fact that the tortfeasor is a nonresident.
State long-arm statutes exist to vindicate the state’s own interests
when the tortfeasor is a nonresident. In a just world, the further
fortuity that the tortfeasor is a government employee would augment rather than diminish the rights of plaintiffs.
The irony of the Court’s positions to the contrary in our two
cases is underscored in cases in which the tort is also a crime. Recently the Supreme Court has offered a vigorous argument that
233
when a tort is also a crime, prosecution is preferable to civil suit.
But if a state employee flees the place of her crime and is indicted
at home (the suggested preferred venue in light of Franchise III),
the place of the crime is very likely to demand rendition, and, under Article IV of the Constitution, the employee’s home state
234
would have to render him up to the place of the crime. Yet, in
cases like Franchise III, the place of the tort cannot take jurisdiction.
This anomaly is just another example of the incoherence of the
Court’s recent thinking about the place of trial in cases of crossborder tort.
V. THE COSTS OF LIABILITY
We know that there are very few cases of interstate government
tort. But in thinking about the rare such case, it is helpful to remember that a large part of the costs of defending would be expended by the tortfeasor’s home state even if the case were litigated there. And it would be litigated there if the law there were more
favorable to the plaintiff. In short, if the state defendant is adjudged to be responsible, it is not unlikely that he would be so
found by a jury at home as well as away. And damages, as sought by
plaintiff’s counsel, would tend to be similar in either state. To be
sure, in interstate litigation there would have been the expensive
nuisance of hiring local counsel, if desired, and of having home
counsel travel to the neighboring state for hearings, if counsel so
chooses. But such inconveniences are borne every day by private
nonresident defendants in tort cases. For a state government these
are not heavy costs.
It makes some economic difference, of course, just where litigation resources are expended. If money is to be spent, any state
would rather have it spent at home. But, again, consider how easily
233. For the Court’s recent statement of this preference, see RJR-Nabisco v. European Union, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (Alito, J.).
234.
U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2, cl. 2.
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these costs can be borne. In the Franchise Tax Board litigation itself,
California cheerfully paid its auditors’ expenses as they encroached
on Mr. Hyatt’s peace and privacy. With equal equanimity California absorbed its lawyers’ expenses as they defended with notable
persistency against Hyatt’s claims.
While I am saying all this, the reader has been thinking, “What
about the fiscal crisis in some of the states. Don’t the states need
immunity? No matter where they are sued?” Especially in the wake
of the economic damage sustained in the current pandemic, how
can any of the states pay for the torts of their workers and employees, much less meet their pension and other obligations? Indeed,
how can a state afford to hire back the part of its workforce that it
has had to let go, much less defend suits against them?
Notwithstanding these important concerns, the states will continue, I believe, to answer to claims alleging injuries at the hands of
their officers. In part, they will do so because liability is not as
heavy a budget item as is supposed, and in part, for the same reason they continue to answer to contract claims and to pay bills as
they come due.
A little thought will reveal why the states enact tort claims acts—
or, by indemnifying employees who are found liable, act as if they
have done so. Most pertinent to this inquiry is the actuality that,
whatever immunities with which they are formally cloaked, most
American states choose to settle claims for injuries caused by their
employees. To the extent they have understood the wisdom of doing so, it cannot matter much just where they are sued. But let us
pause to consider more closely the reasons state governments continue to answer to tort claims.
VI. THE COSTS OF IMMUNITY:
WHY STATES PROVIDE FOR PUBLIC-LAW LITIGATION
It becomes a matter of some interest to weigh the costs of liability against the costs of immunity. A state legislature might consider
it advantageous to provide that the costs of a government tort be
allowed to fall on the state worker occasioning it or, what amounts
to the same thing, on the injured party, even in a wholly domestic
case. But the broad consensus of opinion about best tort policy
long ago reached contrary conclusions. It is widely assumed to be a
superior allocation of the costs of injury to spread them broadly.
Allowing disasters needlessly to affect the lives of individuals has
never made sense and is injurious to society. At the extreme, the
uncompensated tort plaintiff and unindemnified government
worker, both will find it hard to return to productive work, and
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their plight will make the lives of others less comfortable and less
safe. And in a global pandemic the dysfunction associated with
unmanaged liabilities is likely to be greatly magnified.
The point of public-law litigation against state officers is not to
win cases but to protect state employees, while not allowing the
costs of government tort to fall on the injured. But refusal to meet
a state’s tort liabilities will generate heavy consequential costs.
“Advantages” obtained by allowing the risks of employee tort to
lie where they fall will incur their own costs. A state thinking to
protect its fisc by declining to protect its workers from the costs of
litigation and the burden of judgments may find itself struggling to
recruit a workforce. A state unwilling to provide reasonable redress
for injuries caused by its officers can appear lawless and unsafe. A
state government that cares more for its immunities than for its responsibilities can present to visitors and investors a sorry picture of
dysfunction.
One can see more clearly why states tend to take responsibility
for their workers’ torts when one considers the analogy of the fed235
eral Tucker Act. By the Tucker Act, the nation guarantees its own
contracts and waives its own sovereign immunity to contract claims,
immunizing the responsible official for the breach, while relying
236
on internal disciplinary measures for deterrence. The nation
provides the Court of Claims for most commercial claims against it.
The nation does all this for the same reason it pays its bills as they
come due. It is no more in the national interest than in a state’s in237
terest to stiff its suppliers or to steal the wages of its workers. A
nation seeking to protect its fisc in such ways may soon find itself
unable to equip its armies. A state that does not pay its creditors
will soon be unable to buy office supplies.
It might be supposed, these days, with some states under water
for insufficiently funded pension liabilities, and their economies
impacted by the coronavirus pandemic, that concern for a state’s
fisc does justify the Supreme Court’s solicitude. However, the costs
of maintaining a civil litigation division in a legal department, together with all the liabilities the state assumes, amount to a small
238
part of a state budget. California’s annual state budget for 2019–

235. 28 U.S.C. § 1449.
236. Concededly, such measures have not been very effective. See Editorial, The Root of
Impunity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2020, at 8.
237. But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that a state cannot be sued in
its own courts for failing to pay the overtime wage required by an act of Congress, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207k); §203 C.F.R. §216(b) (providing an express right of
action for violation of the Act, with concurrent jurisdiction in both sets of courts).
238. See The 2019-20 Budget: California Spending Plan, LAO (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/4097 [https://perma.cc/B4GQ-Q32Z].
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2020 was the highest in the United States at $214 billion. Like
240
other state budgets, it is focused on health and education. California’s civil litigation department and the liabilities settled or paid
by it, even under California’s liberal statutory arrangements for
public-law litigation, amount at most to some small fraction of the
state’s budgetary allocation to its Justice Department, and that
comprehensive budget is nowhere near the magnitude of the
241
state’s budget for education or health. In short, the costs of civil
litigation against California are vanishingly small as compared with
California’s total budget.
True, a rich state like California can more easily absorb costs
than a less monied state. But the same analysis turns out to apply in
states with very modest budgets, like Nevada. When rules of sovereign immunity—or unrealistic limits on recovery, like Nevada’s—
succeed in balking justice in cases of civil wrong, they save government from liabilities and inconveniences that are too minor to
blame for threats to state workers’ pensions or the state fisc gener242
ally.
For orderly, sensible management of tort liabilities, the states,
243
just as the cities and counties do, and just as the nation does, al-

239. See 2019-20 State Budget: Enacted Budget Detail, CALIF. DEP’T OF FINANCE (June
27, 2019), http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/budget/publication/#/e/2019-20/BudgetDetail
[https://perma.cc/T3H3-QNNT].
240. See id. See generally List of U.S. State Budgets, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/List_of_U.S._state_budgets [https://perma.cc/NFG7-EBGS] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020)
(showing California’s budget for 2017 to have been $214.8 billion and the next highest
budget, New York’s, at $177 billion).
241. See California’s 2019-20 State Budget: Enacted Budget Detail, supra note 239.
242. It must be acknowledged that such estimates could be affected in unpredictable
ways by the pandemic.
243. With respect to suit against the federal government, see, for example, Sarah Macaraig, Border Patrol Violence: U.S. Paid Millions to Settle Claims Against the Agency, THE GUARDIAN
(May 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/01/border-patrol-violenceus-paid-60m-to-cover-claims-against-the-agency [https://perma.cc/Q4TA-VF4D]. With respect to the states, see Iris Lewis, State Settles with 5-hour Energy in False Advertising Lawsuit, VT.
DIGGER (Aug. 14, 2019), https://vtdigger.org/2019/08/14/state-settles-with-5-hour-energyin-false-advertising-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/GNS3-C9JF]; Michelle Theriault Boots, State
Settles Suit by Inmate who Suffered Paralysis at Spring Creek Prison for $1.8 Million, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS (June 19, 2019), https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/2019/06/20/state-settleslawsuit-brought-by-inmate-who-suffered-paralysis-at-spring-creek-prison-for-18-million/
[https://perma.cc/Q7TB-LZSP]; Vickie Aldous, State Will Pay Family After Deadly Drunk Driving Crash, OR. MAIL TRIB. (Aug. 11, 2019), https://mailtribune.com/news/top-stories
/oregon-lawsuit-drunk-driving-crash-duii-fatal-karen-greenstein-jackson-county-wrong-waydriver [https://perma.cc/3DAG-N2KX]; and Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, Michigan State Settles Nassar
Lawsuits for $500 Million, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 17, 2018), https:
//www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/05/17/michigan-state-settles-nassar-survivors-halfbillion-dollar-payout [https://perma.cc/83YT-WE3J] (regarding gymnasts abused by a University doctor). With respect to cities, see, for example, Adert Hassan, Minneapolis to Pay $20
Million to Family of Victim Shot by Police, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2019, at A10.
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ready maintain civil trial divisions in their legal departments. The
states, just as the cities and counties do and the nation does, defend actions against their officers and employees.
The costs of maintaining civil litigation departments staffed with
trial lawyers are sunk and continuing costs that are relatively inelastic to the heaviness or lightness of litigation in a particular year.
These costs are estimated and budgeted for, just as are the costs of
maintaining courts and judges, along with the costs of defending
lawsuits, as well as of settlements and adverse money judgments.
These costs, however heavy, are very small items in a state’s overall
budget. State budgets are measured not in millions, but in billions,
245
largely devoted to education, health, and pensions.
Consider, for example, the recent case of Sandra Bland in Tex246
as. Ms. Bland had been stopped by a state trooper for failing to
signal a lane change. The trooper ordered her out of her car for
insubordination and then had her jailed for resisting arrest. The
young black woman had been on her way to a new job and a new
life as a teacher. She was found hanged in her cell overnight while
in state custody. Texas officials claimed it was suicide. One suspects
that Ms. Bland was strung up in her cell for making inconvenient
noise, but the family was unable to prove wrongful death and
lodged an alternative claim for excessive force by the arresting of247
ficer. Texas has a typical tort claims act. Texas settled the case,
248
reportedly for $1.9 million, a fraction of what it might have had
to pay had the family been able to prove wrongful death. Similarly,
had Ms. Bland’s car been struck accidentally by the trooper’s car,
an action for negligence would have been available against the officer. Texas would have defended the officer or indemnified him,
249
up to the amount of its current dollar indemnification cap.

244. See generally MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., State Sovereign Immunity and Tort
Liability in All 50 States, https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/STATESOVEREIGN-IMMUNITY-AND-TORT-LIABILITY-CHART.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QT97M64D] (last visited Oct. 7, 2020) (describing the liability of each of the fifty states). The
chart in MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., supra, does not include information about
unenacted remedial policies and practices.
245. See Policy Basics: Where Do Our State Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (July 25, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/policybasics-where-do-our-state-tax-dollars-go [https://perma.cc/VXC5-4B8N].
246. See David Montgomery, The Death of Sandra Bland: Is There Anything Left To
Investigate?, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/us
/sandra-bland-texas-death.html [https://perma.cc/6UPU-E6D4].
247. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001–109 (West 2018).
248. See Mary Huber, Advocates Remember Sandra Bland’s Legacy on Day Named in Her Honor,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 13, 2019, at B-1, B-7.
249. See Fernando C. Gomez, A Primer on State Employee Liability, SAM HOUSTON STATE
UNIV. (2011), https://www.shsu.edu/dotAsset/0b97f3e1-3d25-496d-9569-27a1cda534d4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5RX-7ARW].
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With the Supreme Court’s blithe goodbye to both Nevada v. Hall
and Franchise Tax Board, state governments now have a shiny new
federal immunity in interstate cases. Apparently, they can add this
meretricious federal defense to their armamentarium in intrastate
and interstate cases alike, and in state and federal courts alike. All
this federalized immunity may seem gratifying, like a cheap but
glittering toy under the Christmas tree, to the immediate perception of the states’ trial team. Yet, like the cheap toy to the hopeful
child, none of this is what the states really want and need—the intelligent management of government tort.
VII. A POSSIBLE DIFFICULTY FOR TWENTY-NINE STATES
The traditional workaround that defeats government immunity
has always been the officer suit. The plaintiff forgoes suit against
the state and simply sues the individual government employee or
official responsible for her injuries. The party-of-record rule suggests as much. In the long tradition of the common law, a government is not sued as party of record. The rule may reflect the irrational character of naming a non-person as if it were an individual.
The workaround permits suit against the individual alleged to have
been at fault.
In the wake of Franchise III, however, a new difficulty may have
arisen for state management of government workers’ torts. This is
a difficulty affecting the states that have had the wisdom to enact
tort claims acts. It is a particular concern for those among them
that have permitted their tort claims acts to apply to intentional as
well as unintentional torts, thus tending to bring the intentional
government tort within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
250
and the Civil Rights Act.
The difficulty is that, after Franchise III, the mechanism of a tort
claims act could defeat rather than facilitate the traditional officersuit workaround for damages cases. Recall that, in the interest of
protecting both the state worker and her tort victim, a state tort
claims act works by waiving the immunity of the state but immunizing the state worker. This might become an issue in the states that
have tort claims acts, when a plaintiff seeks to sue the very officer
who injured her. Most judges, I think, would not be comfortable
allowing a tort victim to sue an immunized worker, even though
the worker’s employer, the state, is also immunized.

250.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871).

FALL 2020] Sovereign Immunity and Interstate Government Tort

61

After Franchise III, “the Constitution” requires that the state be
immune. Under the same state’s tort claims act, the state officer is
also immune. Where does that leave the plaintiff?
Consider the following scenario. Because a main purpose of the
state tort claims act is to protect the plaintiff, a state court might
permit an officer suit against the immunized employee to proceed,
judicially nullifying the state’s tort claims act. The state would be
very likely to come into court to defend its employee. The state
cannot rely on the very statute the state judge has nullified. The
state might try to argue that its appearance in court constitutes a
waiver of immunity. But that would be the sort of “constructive”
waiver that has been disapproved by the Court; the Court requires
explicit waiver of federalized state immunity, unlike state-law im251
munity, in the clear language in a statute. The waiver of state
immunity, so helpful in suits under tort claims acts before Franchise
III, now could be useless.
The problem may even be bigger than we have thus far imagined. Waiver may be off the table even in wholly domestic cases. Some
of Justice Thomas’s language in Franchise III can be read to cover
that ground. And the problem is not simply one of language. The
fact is, Franchise III cloaked the states with a federal immunity that
is deeply embedded in the federalism that is deeply embedded in the
“structure” of the Constitution. This constitutionally-required immunity cannot rationally be confined to interstate cases, any more
than the Constitution itself can be so confined. Will it ever be possible for a state to waive a constitutional requirement that is deeply
252
embedded in our “constitutional structure”?
The problem is not merely the technical problem that the Supreme Court requires explicit waivers of identified federal immunities, as well as explicit waivers of state immunity (recall that there
253
is a clear statement rule). It is not merely that a typically shortsighted state legislature might, against the state’s own actual interests, explicitly state that its waiver of state immunity is not a waiver
254
of its federal immunity. Consider a domestic case in which the

251. Id. (imposing a clear statement rule now applied both to waivers of immunity by a
state as well as to abrogations of immunity by Congress, and disapproving the doctrine of
“constructive waiver” of Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)).
252. In interstate cases in the configuration seen in Franchise III, the problem of finding
power to waive immunity may be even more perplexing than in domestic cases since the
holding in Franchise III is not dictum with respect to interstate cases.
253. See, e.g., Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2010) (holding that a state does not waive
its sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds, and that waiver of state immunity does
not waive federal immunity); Atascadero v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (creating a clear
statement rule now applied to both waiver of immunity by a state or abrogation of immunity
by Congress).
254. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-23(b) (2019).
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state has waived its federal immunity in the clear language of a
state statute, and cheerfully submits to jurisdiction. An appellate
court could well rule sua sponte that federal sovereign immunity is
jurisdictional. Once taking on that color, federal immunity will almost certainly not be waivable. Jurisdiction is not waivable. Thus,
even explicit state legislative waivers of federalized immunity for
the states may well be beyond a state’s power of waiver. And, a fortiori, waiver could not then reclaim the advantages, in a particular
case, of adjudicatory power over government tort—intrastate as
well as interstate.
It might be supposed that Congress could step in and relieve the
states of this new helplessness. But there is a further difficulty. The
Supreme Court, with bold improvidence, has stripped Congress of
Article I power—any Article I power—to abrogate the immunities
255
of the states. That was the holding of the Seminole Tribe case.
(Even with the passage of time one still shakes one’s head in disbe256
lief.) The Court has had to back down in bankruptcy cases, but
257
has drawn the line there. There can be no other exceptions.
Nothing can explain or justify Seminole Tribe’s sledgehammer attack
on the power of Congress and on federal supremacy.
Franchise III joins Seminole Tribe and Alden v. Maine as an extremist success in the Court’s inexplicable struggle to lavish almost antebellum power on the states, putting it beyond the power of
courts to impose the national will upon the states, and to diminish
the powerful nationhood that the Framers left us and that the Civil
War preserved and advanced.
VIII. WHAT, THEN, IS TO BE DONE?
Broad language in Franchise III, although dictum (and lawyers
should argue that it is dictum), can be taken to have bestowed universal federalized sovereign immunity on the states in domestic as

255. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 46 (1996).
256. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). Katz does not suggest clause-byclause reconsideration of Seminole Tribe; the Court has just held that the Katz exception to
Seminole Tribe is strictly limited to bankruptcy. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002 (2020).
257. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1002. Allen, a copyright case, seems compelled by Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), a patent
case to the same effect. Justice Kagan, writing for the Allen Court, made this point. Allen, 140
S. Ct. at 1002. What is particularly painful about such cases is that they strip Congress not
simply of general Article I power, but of powers specifically granted in Article I—in this instance, the so-called Copyright [and Patent] Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving
Congress power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”).
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well as interstate cases. It is not clear what the Court’s intentions
are for the traditional workaround of an officer suit. Even though
tort claims acts may stand to lose effectiveness, there would seem to
be no reason why traditional officer suits would not work in interstate as well as domestic cases. This would require not only that the
responsible state officer become the named defendant of record
but also that she be pleaded in her “individual capacity,” rather
than, or coupled with, an “official capacity” designation.
“Individual capacity” pleading is little more than a pleading device, but it has become a necessary and useful one. It is explicitly
required in cases pleadable as violations of civil rights—required by
258
259
the early case of Scheuer v. Rhodes, as explained in Hafer v. Melo.
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Hafer Court, pointed out that in260
dividual-capacity pleading avoids the rule of Will v. Michigan,
which held that a state is not a “person” within the meaning of the
Civil Rights Act. It should also avoid the imputation that the
named defendant officer is the state itself. An officer joined as defendant in her official capacity is the “state.”
This is what may have gone wrong in cases like the recent copy261
right case, Allen v. Cooper, in which the defendant of record was
the state governor. All state officials, including a governor, are
“state actors,” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Civil Rights Act. But they are best sued in their individual
capacity. Since a government tort can neither be committed nor
remedied except by the government, the individual held responsible is responsible in her official rather than individual capacity. Because of this dual nature of a government defendant, lawyers have
adopted the expedient of pleading against such a defendant both
262
in her individual capacity and in her official capacity, and the de-

258. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
259. 502 U.S. 21, 29–30 (1991). It follows from Hafer that in cases pleaded in individual
capacity, damages are awarded not against the state, but against the named defendant officer. However, for the reasons given here, the officer in such cases is almost always fully indemnified, and the state will furnish the legal defense as well. In this way the substantial
equivalent of a tort claims act is achieved, notwithstanding the diligently maintained fiction
that the state is immune.
260. 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Will is no longer strictly necessary to the Supreme Court’s evident project of denying enforcement of constitutional rights against the states. A state cannot be sued in either set of courts, as defendant of record, under the Eleventh Amendment
and its background propositions. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (extending a new
federal defense of sovereign immunity to state courts in federal-law cases); Franchise III, 139
S. Ct. 1485 (2019) (extending Alden’s federal immunity defense to state-law cases in state
courts). Lawyers may try to limit Franchise III to state-law violations pleadable as constitutional torts, but I doubt with much success.
261. 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). On Allen v. Cooper, see supra notes 4, 256–57 and accompanying text.
262. Caveat: One would not append the phrase “acting in her official capacity” to the
officer’s name in the caption but would confine that phrase to the allegations of the tort.
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fendant rarely objects, for the same reason that it may have a tort
claims act on the books. The government trial team takes over, or
the government indemnifies in the absence of a tort claims act.
There is a familiar analogy to this problem of “individual capacity” versus “official capacity” in the Anglo-American officer suit in
equity. The officer suit in equity was made fit for modern Ameri263
can use in the great case of Ex parte Young (1908). There, the Supreme Court, by Justice Peckham, held that a state’s attorney general, defendant in an injunction case alleging a threatened or
ongoing violation of the Constitution, is not the “state” for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity but remains a “state actor”
for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment liability. Justice Peckham,
in Young, declined to hold the Eleventh Amendment trumped by
the after-enacted Fourteenth Amendment. He stated, impressively,
264
that he intended to give each Amendment its full value. He then
explained that the responsible official, for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is a state actor, and of course is a state actor in reality.
But by his alleged infraction, for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment,
265
the officer is “stripped” of the state’s cloak of immunity.
Peckham was no liberal. Undoubtedly he intended the power he
266
carved out for the courts in Young to be deployed in enforcement
267
of his opinion in Lochner and its new “liberty of contract,” pro-

The phrase “in his individual capacity” is used in a case’s caption, to identify the capacity in
which the officer is sued.
263. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that neither the immunity of the Eleventh Amendment nor the principle underlying the Anti-Injunction Act, today found at 28 U.S.C. §2283,
bars a federal injunction against a state official to block a threatened or ongoing violation of
federal law). Justice Peckham points out that the federal court was first seized of the action—that no action was then pending in the state court.
When such indictment or proceeding is brought to enforce an alleged unconstitutional statute, which is the subject-matter of inquiry in a suit already pending in
a Federal court, the latter court, having first obtained jurisdiction over the subject-matter, has the right, in both civil and criminal cases, to hold and maintain
such jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, until its duty is fully performed. But the Federal court cannot, of course, interfere in a case where the
proceedings were already pending in a state court.
209 U.S. at 161–62 (citation omitted).
264. Id. at 150 (“We think that whatever the rights of complainants may be, they are
largely founded upon [the Fourteenth] Amendment, but a decision of this case does not
require an examination or decision of the question whether its adoption in any way altered
or limited the effect of the earlier [Eleventh] Amendment. We may assume that each exists
in full force . . . .”).
265. Id. at 160.
266. In General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), decided on the same day as Ex parte
Young, the Court held, by Justice McKenna, that state courts were under like obligation to
supply the federal injunctive remedy in federal-law cases in equity.
267. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (Peckham, J.). Alas, this “liberty of
contract” was the imagined “liberty” of an unemployed person to “agree” to inadequate
wages, long hours, and unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, free from state regulation.
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tected substantively by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But the common law grows and evolves, and the
power carved out in Young to diminish protections for workers is
the power that eventually became the federal structural injunction
that enforced Brown v. Board of Education.
The suit against a named official in actions at law, although very
different, gains force from the reasoning that sustains Ex parte
Young actions in equity. Young’s immunity-stripping rationale sheds
some light on the Supreme Court’s insistence on individualcapacity pleading in an officer suit seeking damages. The Supreme
Court explicitly relied on the analogy between the officer suit in
equity and the action at law against an officer in holding, in Hafer
v. Melo (a federal civil rights action for damages), that a state official is sued in her “individual capacity” for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment but is charged with violating federal law in her “offi268
269
cial capacity” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
official, although “stripped” of her government employer’s cloak of
immunity, nevertheless is very much a government official—a state
actor—when she stands accused of constitutional tort.
Nor do these contrasting statements together comprise a mere
legal fiction, as is commonly supposed. Both statements can be
read simply as true. Any logician will tell you that the answer to a
question depends on the purpose for which it is asked.
In a sense, an Ex parte Young action is always necessarily one in
“official capacity,” yet it is equally true that equity can act only in
personam. Again, both features of Young are instructive and correct.
The defendant in a Young action must be the very official who can
remedy the threatened tort by obeying the court’s injunction. Of
course he can do so only in his official capacity. On the other
hand, if he fails to obey the injunction, it is his person, not his office, that is threatened with contempt and ultimately a period of
detention or other penalty. It will be recalled that Ex parte Young
itself was handed down while the attorney general of Minnesota
was confined in federal custody for contempt of a federal injunction. As Justice Harlan put this, vigorously dissenting, federal au270
thorities had laid “violent hands” on the state’s attorney general.
I state all this partly to raise the question whether relief from
Franchise III might be available in equity. That is, can a court sitting
268. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
269. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237–38 (1974).
270. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There was no reason why
[the trial court] should have laid violent hands upon the attorney general of Minnesota, and
by its orders have deprived the state of the services of its constitutional law officer in its own
courts.”). Indeed, Attorney General Young was before the Supreme Court both on a grant of
appellate review and by a prayer for a writ of habeas corpus—that, is, for release.
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in equity order the payment of damages? The short answer is,
271
“No.” There are monetary equitable remedies—restitution and
disgorgement come to mind—that might suggest the availability of
monetary relief in equity. But it is a general requirement of injunctive relief that there be no adequate legal remedy. In cases against
a state officer, a court cannot require a payment of money that
could otherwise be an item of damages. The legal remedy, the action at law for damages, would be “adequate,” and the action for
injunction would be dismissed.
The plaintiff seeking monetary relief would probably do better
in an action at law for damages than an action in equity for an injunction. An action at law might lie if seeking damages from a
named state officer in her individual capacity for unjust failure to
provide support for which the plaintiff is fully eligible. This action
can include claims for consequential damages beyond the payments themselves—harms to health, loss of a home, or other serious consequences—losses for which an injunction to make the
payments due will not compensate.
In a case of intentional government tort, like Franchise Tax
Board, a case which might be pleadable as a constitutional tort,
there is some power in Congress to abrogate state immunity under
272
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This power should
have enabled Congress to abrogate a state’s immunity in constitutional cases. But the Supreme Court has curtailed the Section 5
power. The Section 5 power must be exercised in a manner that is
“proportionate” to and has “congruence” with a perceived substan273
tial pattern of known violations. Even if our present gridlocked
Congress were capable of enacting an explicit abrogation of state
immunity in cases of interstate constitutional tort, the Supreme
Court would strike down the effort as disproportionate for such a
small number of cases. That was the problem in the case that itself
invented the tests of proportionality and congruence. Religious
274
freedom was argued to be at stake in the Boerne case, but the
271. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 US 651 (1974). Edelman’s proscription, under the Eleventh Amendment, of an injunction for arrearages with respect to a federal statutory benefit is
now somewhat tempered by a case on similar facts, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976),
which recognized a limited power of Congress in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.
272. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
273. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted
to that end.”). This late-blooming requirement of proportionality and congruence put the
kibosh on intellectual property cases against a state. Until Boerne, those cases were relying on
the Section 5 power of Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, although it would
appear that misappropriation of intellectual property by state universities is substantial, particularly under “work for hire” and similar rationales.
274. Id.
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Boerne Court, in striking down the sweeping Religious Freedom
Restoration Act in its application to the states, read the language of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment under this new federal
stricture of proportionality and congruence, seeing no such pat275
tern of violations as would justify the legislation. Boerne was correctly decided, but the Court has used these vague standards to attack the power of Congress even in matters of national commercial
concern, like the regulation of labor, and even in the field of civil
276
rights.
There may still be room for solutions in some cases of interstate
government tort. Courts at the place of injury, wishing to secure
needed remediation for their own residents, might have leeway to
carve out exceptions to, or distinctions from, Franchise III. Exceptions might be found, for example, for cases in which the defendant nonresident official has deliberately inflicted physical injuries,
or for cases pleaded as constitutional torts rather than as state-law
torts.
In the end, however, we have to consider, notwithstanding the
unlikelihood of success, the possibility of a frontal challenge to the
régime of state sovereign immunity, from Hans v. Louisiana on
down, including late-blooming federalized immunity. Peace to Justice Holmes, but the common law surely has the capacity to move
277
by molar as well as molecular motions. The day may come, a
generation or two hence, when the Supreme Court, and the states
that unthinkingly sought a diminution in their own powers, will
come to see Franchise III for what it was—a mistaken accommodation to short-sighted impulses.
275. Id. at 530.
276. See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30 (2012) (striking down the
Family Medical Leave act’s self-care provision as applied to the states as employers, and
holding that Congress had no power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the state employers in such cases, citing Seminole Tribe and Boerne); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress had no power to abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states as employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act, citing Seminole
Tribe and Boerne).
277. See S. Pac. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I recognize
without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially;
they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”). Although there is truth in Justice
Holmes’ observation, there are moments in legal history (Jensen is one of them) when the
common law has not confined itself to incremental advances. Think, for example, of the
judicial creation of product liability in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.
1916), which ruled that, if manufacturing negligence is reasonably certain to cause peril,
knowing that others may use the product, the manufacturer is obligated to make the product carefully. In Jensen, the Supreme Court identified the common law applied in admiralty
cases as that of the federal sovereign, implied national lawmaking power in Congress from
Article III’s grant of jurisdiction, and implied judicial lawmaking power from the implied
power of Congress. 244 U.S. at 215–16. The Jensen Court held federal case law, sparse as it
then was, supreme over a state statute, the New York workers’ compensation law, ruling that
federal admiralty law completely preempted the field. Id. at 218.
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Challenges to the immunities of a state might not be without
appeal to our textualist courts. As we have been reminded here,
there is no language in the Eleventh Amendment or anywhere else
in the Constitution requiring the blanket federalized immunity
with which the states are now burdened. One need only re-read the
Eleventh Amendment to see that it is irrelevant to the questions
posed in modern immunity cases. State sovereign immunity is one
of the many doctrines the Supreme Court has invented that turn
out to have little use beyond stripping the nation and the states of
needed adjudicatory powers.
Many of the Supreme Court’s non-enforcement doctrines, although existing in large bodies of jurisprudence, are, after all, only
federal case law. Since state sovereign immunity is a creature of
case law, it can be overruled, just as Nevada v. Hall was overruled.
Constitutional amendment should not be necessary.
In the long tradition of Anglo-American common law, “Freedom
278
slowly broadens down / From precedent to precedent.” But that
poetic insight views the judicial process in a top-down way, a way
that is, in fact, unworkable and unreal. The “potted plant” theo279
ry, which holds that lower courts must woodenly apply Supreme
Court precedents and Courts of Appeals precedents, is simply
wrong. Obviously, the argument for change must be made early in
280
a litigation to ensure that it is not waived.
In the last analysis, it is up to us in the profession to free our281
selves from “potted plant” reliance on the existing legal order.
There is nothing wrong with the bold argument for salutary
change. Counsel can argue that Franchise III was wrongly decided,
and trial and appellate courts can reassess Franchise III and, indeed,

278. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, You Ask Me, Why, Tho’ Ill at Ease, reprinted in V THE
ENGLISH POETS 116 (Thomas Humphry Ward ed., 1918) (poem, describing England as: “A
land of settled government, / A land of just and old renown, / Where Freedom broadens
slowly down / From precedent to precedent”).
279. See Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task of
Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 850–51 (1993) (criticizing the Supreme
Court’s view that lower courts should woodenly follow existing but outmoded Supreme
Court precedent until such time as the Supreme Court changes the law itself); see, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“We do not suggest that the Court of Appeals on its own authority should have taken the step of renouncing Wilko. If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”).
280. Retired Justice Tom C. Clark once said: “In the final analysis, the nation’s law is
made in the trial court.” Craig Alan Smith, Sitting by Designation: Retired Justice Tom C. Clark’s
Federal Court Service, 43 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 321, 322.
281. See Levinson, supra note 279.
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282

all the immunity cases. And after some decades of rejection, as
the personnel on the Supreme Court shifts, the Court may come to
see more clearly that, however vast the superstructure of state immunity the Court has labored to erect, state governments will continue to find it necessary and useful to work around that superstructure.
In the long run, it is possible that there will emerge a frank
recognition in some future Supreme Court that public-law litigation, interstate as well as intrastate, federal as well as state, does go
on, although requiring the pleading of archaic fictions. The Court
may come to see that public-law litigation might as well take place
upon more reasonable straightforward pleading. The complexities
we have been examining should never have been imposed on cases
of government tort.
New problems will no doubt generate new workarounds to overcome them, and more defenses will arise to block those expedients. There is no good reason for any of this. The wisdom of compensatory and deterrent tort policy has been understood and
widely shared and is hardly controversial. In a straight-thinking
world, the fiction of government immunity, the superstructure of
fictitious workarounds and pleading devices required to suppress
it, and the morass of rules surrounding waiver and abrogation—all
would have been put behind us long ago and exchanged for uncomplicated access to justice, in both interstate and domestic cas283
es.
While waiting for this to happen, the simplest way to achieve
reasonable access now, consistent with widely shared tort law and
policy, would be to substitute for the whole tottering edifice of sovereign immunity at all levels of American government the common
law’s functional equivalent of a good tort claims act—respondeat superior. When ordinary private workers’ torts are administered, it is
well understood that the ill-paid employee, or even the salaried executive, cannot pay damages for serious injuries that may have
been caused by acts done within the scope of their employment.
Thus, in private cases, no tort claims act is needed. The employer is
pleaded in naturally, having spread the risk through insurance.
The insurer comes in, defends, and pays any judgment.

282. On the problem of remediation of federal government tort, see Vicki C. Jackson,
Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 521 (2003), which calls on the judiciary to move toward closing remedial gaps
in suits against the United States. This is another fine addition to Professor Jackson’s portfolio of work on sovereign immunity.
283. Accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L.
REV. 933, 933 (2019).
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The common wisdom grounding respondeat superior should be
extended unambiguously to intentional torts. For government employees, this means coverage not only for their ordinary torts of
negligence or recklessness but also their violations of civil rights
legislation or of the Constitution.
A private college responds naturally, in every case, to tort claims
against its professor or president or dean or mailroom clerk, for
torts within the scope of their employment. The state university
should similarly respond to tort claims against its employees. There
284
is no defense of private employer immunity, and there should be
none when the employer is the state. On the other hand, the immunity of every worker should be absolute, whether she is employed
by government or a private company. She will be within the disciplinary measures of her department or agency or company. The
measure of liability is actual damages, emotional as well as monetary, tangible or intangible, economic or personal, past or future—
285
excepting only punitive damages. The state employer will have
insurance, spreading the costs of liability broadly.
Prosecutors and judges already have absolute “official” immunity. So should every police officer and schoolteacher. It is a form of
employee/worker immunity that should extend to everyone who
works and in the course of doing so causes an injury. A government, like a company or organization, cannot act except by its personnel. Litigation against government for the torts of government
workers and officers should be as commonplace as litigation
against employers for the torts of privately employed workers.
The use of respondeat superior in cases of government tort would
require overrule of the principle of the Monell case, denying re286
spondeat superior in actions against a city, a rule now commonly
applied at all levels of government. Tort claims acts should be ad-

284. The exception is in the case of injury to the worker herself, in which case workers’
compensation statutes usually remove the worker completely from the tort system. These
statutes typically provide only a fraction of lost wages for a limited time and out-of-pocket
medical expenses. There is no compensation for pain, or loss of limb or health, or grief
therefor.
There is also considerable legislative interference with general tort law. Particularly unjust may be the consequences of state legislation limiting tort recoveries to economic losses
only. Future economic losses may be discounted as speculative. And economic losses may be
insufficient to justify a lawyer’s taking the case.
285. For the general rule of sovereign non-liability for punitive damages, see supra notes
78, 114 and accompanying text. Extending the rule against punitives to private employers
would be protective of the employer and, indirectly, of other employees.
286. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that, in actions against
a municipality, there can be no respondeat superior). A city is liable only for its own tort. This
means that municipal liability is proved by a showing of city policy attributable to officials at
a high level of authority.
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ministered with the understanding that they simply codify common-law respondeat superior.
Other writers are suggesting the expedient of respondeat superior,
moved by the same concern for widely shared tort policies ex287
pressed here. Arguing for respondeat superior in civil rights cases,
Professor Fallon writes, “An ideal regime would substitute entity
[for example, government or administrative agency] liability for
288
officer liability and afford fairer opportunities for victims . . . .”
Respondeat superior is a traditional concept comfortable to American
judges and lawyers.
IX. CHANGING PLACES, SHIFTING POSITIONS
In our time a new “conservative” idea is attracting attention.
Younger conservatives are talking about reining in the bureaucracy, “taking back the administrative state,” and reducing the size of
government. 289 (The point of much of this, apparently, is to reduce
the taxes that pay for social programs.) This revived conservative
project requires putting paid to such doctrines as “Chevron defer290
ence” —and other forms of deference to the political branches.
Deference to the political branches until very recently had been
encouraged by conservatives who were angered by the perceived
judicial activism of the Warren Court’s liberals back in the middle
of the twentieth century. This anger has fed into modern doctrines
of separation of powers, deference to the legislature, federalism,
states’ rights, and a supposed impotence of the judiciary to fashion
remedial law.
Liberals, for their part, with their old New Deal faith in government, now seem increasingly to take the reactionary position that
291
even bad government should be left unfettered. In other words,

287. See Fallon, supra note 283 and accompanying text.
288. Id. at 933.
289. See Justin Walker, The Kavanaugh Court and the Schechter-to-Chevron Spectrum: How
the New Supreme Court Will Make the Administrative State More Democratically Accountable, 95 IND.
L.J. 923 (2020); Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017). For book treatment, see, for example, ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S
ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016), which distinguishes argument, urging the importance of a judicial check on the administrative state; and
CARL HULSE, CONFIRMATION BIAS: INSIDE WASHINGTON’S WAR OVER THE SUPREME COURT,
FROM SCALIA’S DEATH TO JUSTICE KAVANAUGH (2019), which advocates the appointment of
an activist federal judiciary that will “deconstruct” the administrative state and ease burdensome regulation. See generally, e.g., Symposium, Thirty-Seventh Annual Federalist Society National
Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2019).
290. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (proposing that courts defer to the institutional competence of the administrative agencies).
291. See supra note 97 on Astrue v. Capato, 566 U.S. 541 (2012).
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the post-Warren Court political positioning of the Justices is reversing, or at least shifting, in cases presenting the question of state responsibility. And this suggests that changes of heart are occurring
on the rôle of courts in cases challenging official wrongdoing.
It will be interesting to see if regret for doctrines of deference
comes to suggest a similar regret for our overwrought Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. Why would today’s small-government
conservatives want to remove government from judicial oversight?
For that matter, why would today’s liberals want to avoid instantiat292
ing the Bill of Rights and justice in the individual case?
That the Court’s conservative majority would imagine blanket
state impunity to be a conservative position and should struggle to
fit the position into our federalism and the Constitution is, in my
view, incomprehensible. A rethinking of true conservative values in
this context—instantiation of the rule of law, domestic peace, and
protection against overweening or abusive governance—is long
overdue.
It may seem fanciful to suggest that the newly potent conservative Court could turn the Court’s long hostility to federal common
law actions toward reconsideration of federal common law defenses.
Yet the new conservative Court has an opportunity to become the
Court of enforcement of the Constitution and laws. Chief Justice
Earl Warren, the author of one of our proudest cases, Brown v.
293
Board of Education, was a Republican, and the Warren Court oversaw a new birth of freedom. The first Justice Harlan, who dissented
294
so eloquently in Plessy v. Ferguson, was a conservative Southerner.
I would guess that our conservative Justices, some now in the
prime of their lives, having been put to the task of writing unconvincing opinions to justify decisions in cases like Hernandez v. Me295
296
sa and RJR-Nabisco v. European Community, are ready to oversee a
more lawful nation—ready to enforce the Constitution and laws,
and ready for actual textualism and zealous insistence on the rule
of law.
Especially at this moment in history, a time of ignorant and divisive attacks on our national traditions and ideals—on civil society
itself—the Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Roberts,
could come into its own as a saving custodian of our rights, our
laws, our national ideals, and our domestic peace.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

For example, see supra note 97 on Astrue.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
140 S.Ct. 735 (2020).
136 S.Ct. 2090 (2016).
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CONCLUSION
State immunity has been building and expanding in the Supreme Court for more than a century. Yet it seems obvious that
sovereign immunity defeats justice. As Justice Miller put it in 1882,
297
in a famous opinion on federal sovereign immunity:
Looking at the question upon principle, . . . we think . . .
the defense [of sovereign immunity] cannot be maintained. It seems to be opposed to all the principles upon
which the rights of the citizen, when brought in collision
with the acts of the government, must be determined. In
such cases there is no safety for the citizen, except in the
protection of the judicial tribunals, for rights which have
been invaded by the officers of the government, professing
to act in its name. . . . No man in this country is so high that
298
he is above the law.
Civil society rests, for foundation, on the rule of law. And the
rule of law rests, for foundation, on a judiciary sufficiently independent to ride herd on government. A democracy is only as good
as its judiciary is empowered to protect the rights of persons as
against the majoritarian branches. As Chief Justice Marshall said in
299
our greatest case, Marbury v. Madison, “The government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws,
and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested le300
gal right.”
These legacies of rule of law and judicial independence are bequeathed us in our founding Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and
the Civil War Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment explicitly
imposes upon the states the duty of enforcing the rights of individuals. We rely on the courts to expound these legacies. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
301
what the law is.”

297. The two bodies of jurisprudence on sovereign immunity, federal and state, are substantially congruent and cases are often cited interchangeably.
298. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218–21 (1882) (dealing with the Union’s appropriation of Arlington, the Lee family’s homestead, for alleged incorrect proffer of a tax
due). After the Lee opinion was handed down, the United States settled with the Lee family
for some $200,000. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (Marshall,
C.J.).
299. See Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1412 (2003) (rebutting revisionist attacks on Marbury and Chief Justice Marshall).
300. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch), at 163.
301. Id. at 177.
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Had the Court in Franchise III clearly stated that it was simply deploying a party-of-record rule, shielding the states from being sued
as named defendants, I would not have written this paper. But the
Franchise III Court attempted to embed immunity so deeply in the
Constitution that in an action against an injured party’s own state
worker or agency, his own state courts would be helpless to furnish
justice under his own state’s law.
In the fact situation in Nevada v. Hall—negligence by a state
worker causing personal injuries in another state—the case filled a
remedial gap, ensuring that in our federal interstate system the
basic workings of sound tort law would be accessible when, had the
defendant been a private party, the plaintiff would have been permitted to proceed. The risk of personal injury or death at the
hands of a state worker should not fall on the injured party simply
because of the mischance that the injuror was a government worker from another state.
On the broad issue of state sovereign immunity for deliberate injuries inflicted by government officials from another state, the Supreme Court in Franchise III was even more gravely mistaken. Franchise I had filled an even more consequential remedial gap. The
Franchise III Court should have paused to consider whether the
requisites of a civil society and interstate peace outweigh the desire
of government trial teams to win cases. We cannot license the
states to intrude on each other’s territory to harass or attack each
other’s residents. It should have been obvious to the whole Court,
and to the states themselves, that the opportunity presented in
Franchise III was to secure a needed state power of territorial governance and to put that power at the option of every state.
The Supreme Court threw away these salutary options, giving
the appearance of a willful exercise of a secured political power.
This, in the dubious interest of creating a constitutional shield
against remediation of government lawlessness. The Court’s majority has entangled itself in its own rewriting of history and in an ob302
solescent (and irrelevant ) critique of judicial review that younger
303
theorists are coming to regret.
There are institutions without which our federalism, our Union,
and our democracy cannot thrive. These surely include access to
courts, judicial oversight of government, remedies for wrongs, and
302. Judicial review of government tort is to be distinguished from judicial review of legislation. This paper is not an argument for return of the Lochner era, during which the Supreme Court was striking down useful laws, federal and state, as violating the Constitution. I
am grateful to my colleague Sanford Levinson for raising this possibility of a revival of Lochner-style judicial review at my faculty colloquium of November 15, 2019.
303. For the changing positions, for example, of the Federalist Society, see supra note
289 and works there cited.
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justice in the individual case. These must and will be restored to us
in full. Only case law stands in the way, and cases can be overruled.
304
The long reign of “general common law” under Swift v. Tyson
305
was undone by Erie v. Tompkins, and the long reign of racial seg306
regation under Plessy v. Ferguson was undone by Brown v. Board of
307
Education. Let us be confident that, however long we may have to
308
wait, in good time the long reign of Hans v. Louisiana will be undone in the same way, with the stroke of a pen. With Hans the obsolescent Eleventh Amendment itself will fall into deserved desue309
tude, together with its background “postulates.” The long reign
of manifold missteps that have led us to blanket federal immunity
310
for the misconduct of government personnel will be undone.
311
Seminole Tribe will be undone, so that at long last the power of
Congress to deal with state misgovernance will be revived and
honored. Under this new dispensation, the Supreme Court’s long
abnegation of its basic duty to enforce the Constitution in actions
312
against federal officials —that, too, will be undone.
Even if we must wait a hundred years, conservatives and liberals
together can look forward to that better day. Together, sharing our
313
“decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” we can succeed.
Our shared national traditions can and will be restored to us, and
314
civil governance under the rule of law will take on renewed vigor
and meaning.
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